Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost

Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Wettstein, David

doi:10.2139/ssrn.218048

Cited by 14 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The result is proven in Konrad and Leininger (2007), who combine and extend results of Baye et al (1996) and Kaplan et al (2003). Intuitively, if t 1 = l and t j = e for all j = 2, .…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 71%

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Konrad

Leininger

2010

Public Choice

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We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the 'big-man' in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members' contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish preferences.

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“…The result is proven in Konrad and Leininger (2007), who combine and extend results of Baye et al (1996) and Kaplan et al (2003). Intuitively, if t 1 = l and t j = e for all j = 2, .…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 71%

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Konrad

Leininger

2010

Public Choice

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“…Participating in the auction generates a fixed cost c i for bidder i which is private information and is drawn independently from the interval [0,1] according to the distribution function F . 6 We assume that F is continuously twice differentiable with F (0) = 0 and is common knowledge. 7 The bidders' entry costs are wasted in the sense that the seller does not benefit from these costs.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions with Private Entry Costs

Kaplan

Sela

2003

SSRN Journal

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We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the object being sold, and also an asymmetric environment where bidders may have different valuations for the object. The auction designs that maximize the social surplus or the seller's payoff are analyzed.

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“…Under complete information, Kaplan et al [2000] show that the existence of this relationship may introduce substantial qualitative changes to the behavior of the contestants. In this paper, we study such bid-dependent rewards under incomplete information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

et al. 2000

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We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder!s privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.

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Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Auctions with Private Entry Costs

All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

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