Medieval legal theory generally recognized three grades of proof: full proofs (probatio plena), which could alone offer complete proof; imperfect proofs (probatio semiplena), which were strong pieces of proof, but not strong enough to stand alone as grounds for conviction; and circumstantial evidence (indicia), which was clearly inferior and which alone could only rouse suspicion, not determine guilt.1 Inquisitorial procedure freed magistrates to consider many kinds of proofs, especially circumstantial evidence (indicia),2 and fama could serve as partial proof.3 A hierarchy of proofs ranged from irrefutable proof (confession), to full and certain proof (two eyewitnesses); half-proofs, which could be compelling pieces of witness testimony or strong circumstantial evidence, and quarter-proofs or uncertain proofs.4 This last category was the most common, and was particularly useful in all manner of cases because it was more flexible. In the courts, indicia were the most common sort of proof.5This system of statutory proofs grew in the ius commune and thus was widely applicable, but even so it is difficult to say how judges reached their conclusions, and hard to know how strictly this hierarchy was applied in practice. In Florence, statutory requirements for proof appeared to largely remove judicial discretion from the determination of guilt or innocence, but in practice, there was no clear measure of the quality of these proofs or rules for their combination, and judges held a great deal of discretion in evaluating evidence.6 In Reggio, the statutes address only occasionally issues of proof, and not in a consistent manner.