Inquiry in the<i> Meno</i>

Fine, Gail

doi:10.1017/ccol0521430186.006

Cited by 45 publications

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“…For the most part it is agreed that the slave in some sense 'recollects' and that the opinions he voices are from 'within' himself and not simply 'put there' by Socrates: Klein (1989: 103-7) has a thorough discussion and he distinguishes between answering questions in light of external factors like pride from genuinely attending to the issue at hand; Bluck (1961: 12-14) says that the slave expresses his own opinion in contradistinction to simply being told through sophistic teaching; Devereux (1978: 119-20) fleshes out this latter concept as teaching that comes from without as opposed to within; Vlastos (1994) stresses the a priori nature of the problem (e.g. 97) and that the slave is led to make mistakes and thus must think for himself (98); as does Moravcsik (1994) 123-6;Scott (2006: 100-5) thinks the contrast is between forming a belief from hearsay and thinking for oneself, rather than the a priori; see also Tarrant (2005) 48-9;and Fine (2003) 58-9 who stresses independent reflection. his students to speak boldly on any topic regardless of their knowledge of that topic.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

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Meno and the Slave

Nathan

2022

Antichthon

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This paper argues that the slave demonstration in Plato's Meno contains a carefully-wrought analogy of Meno's dialectic which can guide our understanding of the dialogue. This analogy exposes and diagnoses Meno's failings as a student who is unwilling to engage in the learning process but simply wants to be spoon-fed information. This, in turn, reveals the way Plato wants us to interact with his text: insofar as the author makes his point implicitly and allusively, we are aptly required to puzzle our way through the text to unravel the meaning. We must actively engage with the text. The Meno, thus, exemplifies its own didactic message. In this way, I hope to offer a meaningful interpretation of a significant passage in Plato as well as provide a case study of how he can marshal the literary resources at his disposal towards his philosophical ends.

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Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See e.g. : Ionescu (2007) 44-6; Bluck ('latent knowledge' that we must recollect); Fine (2003) 51-4 (belief); Tarrant (2005) 36;and Ebert (2007: 187) who thinks that the paradox is not so much a philosophical problem as it is a hindrance to the dialectic. Franklin (2001: e.g.…”

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Meno and the Slave

Nathan

2022

Antichthon

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“…3 3 The minimal capacities required to undertake an inquiry—a question‐conception—are importantly different from the capacities required to do so productively. Plato Meno is relevant here, as are discussions in for example, Fine, 1992, 2014; Scott, 2006, pp. 75–91; White, 1974. …”

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confidence: 98%

“…"3 The minimal capacities required to undertake an inquiry-a question-conception-are importantly different from the capacities required to do so productively. Plato Meno is relevant here, as are discussions in for example,Fine, 1992Fine, , 2014 Scott, 2006, pp. 75-91;White, 1974. 4 They might, for example, know something about the categorial behaviour of A, or the general category to which A belongs, but little else.5 Minimal knowledge of what it is to A would be knowledge that is clear without being distinct, on the understandings of those notions discussed inWiggins (2007).6 This stage functions in Cook Wilson's argument in broadly the same way that Frege's omnipresence thesis-the thesis that the power to think that p is, or depends upon, the power to think that it is true that p-figures in his.…”

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John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge

Longworth

Wimmer

2022

European J of Philosophy

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Can knowledge be defined? We expound an argument of John Cook Wilson's that it cannot. Cook Wilson's argument connects knowing with having the power to inquire. We suggest that if he is right about that connection, then knowledge is, indeed, indefinable. | INTRODUCTIONCan knowledge be defined? That is, can knowledge be characterised completely by appeal to universals other than, and understandable independently of, itself? On pain of an infinite descent of definitions, it cannot be that every universal can be so characterised. Some universals must be in that sense indefinable. Is knowledge amongst them? Unlike the case of justified true belief, which seems to wear its definability on its sleeve, there is no obvious reason, available at the outset of inquiry, to expect that knowledge can be defined. As in other such cases, the initial burden of proof resides with those seeking to defend the claim that it can be. That is not yet to claim that the burden cannot be borne, or even that, at this late stage in ongoing inquiry, no reasons have been offered for accepting that the burden now resides with those in the other camp. It is to claim only that in the absence of a specific case for thinking that knowledge is definable, it is reasonable to hold that it is not. Against that dialectical background, John Cook Wilson argued that knowledge is indefinable.In his book Statement and Inference (1926), assembled from lecture notes and other materials by A. S. L. Farquharson and published posthumously, Cook Wilson writes:Perhaps most fallacies in the theory of knowledge are reduced to the primary one of trying to explain the nature of knowing or apprehending. We cannot construct knowing-the act of apprehending-out of any elements. I remember quite early in my philosophical reflection having an instinctive aversion to the very expression "theory of knowledge". I felt the words themselves suggested a fallacy-an

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“…Plato on Knowledge and Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 2, G Fine ( 1992 ). 'Inquiry in the Meno' and R.Robinson ( 1953 ) Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford: Clarendon Press), chapter 5 .…”

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‘The Socratic Method!’: Wittgenstein and Plato

Perissinotto¹

2013

Wittgenstein and Plato

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Inquiry in the Meno

Cited by 45 publications

References 0 publications

Meno and the Slave

Meno and the Slave

John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge

‘The Socratic Method!’: Wittgenstein and Plato

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