Inquiry, knowledge and understanding

Abstract

This paper connects two important debates in epistemology-to wit, on the goal of inquiry and on the nature of understanding-and offers a unified knowledgebased account of both.

An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons

“…9 For a recent argument that the tension between epistemic and zetetic norms should not lead us to revise either set of norms, see Thorstad (forthcoming). 10 For defenses of knowledge as the aim of inquiry, see Kelp (forthcoming a;b;2021;.…”

“…For exceptions to this tendency, see e.g. Friedman (forthcoming; 2020; see also her 2018 and 2019),Kelp (2021; forthcoming a),Hookway (2006;, and Thorstad (forthcoming).…”

Understanding Attribution: Problems, Options, and a Proposal

“…Kelp's account (Kelp, 2015; Kelp, 2017; Kelp, 2018) is interesting to discuss because it is one of the earlier explicit attempts at answering the questions that we started with to an appropriate degree of precision, and it has various features that make it illustrative of how to account for some kinds of context‐sensitivity 45 . Kelp's account of understanding is knowledge‐first–friendly: according to him, understanding phenomena is a form of well‐connected knowledge.…”

“…This results from Kelp underlying assumptions about inquiry, which are not entirely explicit: either understanding is only relevant in the context of the epistemic‐task of inquiry or inquiry is taken to be a sort of overarching epistemic task that we are not in a position to avoid or suspend (cf. Kelp (2018)). This is not the place to settle these questions, but it should not be difficult to grant that there is space for divergent views on the matter.…”

“…Now that we have all the pieces of the TBMU model at hand, we can compare it with some alternative accounts from the literature. Because there is no shortage of accounts in offer, I will limit myself to three accounts that have aspects that are interesting to discuss here: Specifically, I will my compare proposal with those of Kelp (2015, 2017, 2018), Baumberger (2019), Baumberger and Brun (2017), De Regt (De Regt, 2017), and Wilkenfeld (2018, 2013). It has to be noted that my worry here is purely the model of attribution (the TBMU is not a theory of understanding by itself), so I am not concerned with their substantive accounts of understanding apart from the way in which those interact with their models of attribution.…”