2018
DOI: 10.1017/9781108560511
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4
3
1

Relationship

1
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 56 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 98 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Social service provision can generate a reputational advantage for Islamist political parties (Cammett and Luong, 2014), alternatively Islamist activists may also use civil society to critique political compromise by the party (Sigillò, 2023). The relationship between the original piety movement and later political ambition is often a source of ongoing internal tension (McCarthy, 2018a;Meijer, 2021).…”
Section: Connecting Daʿwa and Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Social service provision can generate a reputational advantage for Islamist political parties (Cammett and Luong, 2014), alternatively Islamist activists may also use civil society to critique political compromise by the party (Sigillò, 2023). The relationship between the original piety movement and later political ambition is often a source of ongoing internal tension (McCarthy, 2018a;Meijer, 2021).…”
Section: Connecting Daʿwa and Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda were willing to forge a coalition government and power-sharing agreement that helped move the political process forward even as the U.S. Embassy in Tunis was attacked in 2012, two leftist MPs were assassinated in 2013, and terrorist attacks occurred in Tunis and Sousse in 2016. Ennahda acted to ensure its long-term political survival, having learned from its difficult history of repression and the renewed crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt following the 2013 military coup (McCarthy 2018;Wolf 2013Wolf , 2018Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2012). In 2015, a quartet of organizations-the Tunisian General Labor Union; the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts; the Tunisian Human Rights League; and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers-assembled in 2013 after the assassinations of the two leftist deputies, received the Nobel Peace Prize for helping steer the Tunisian political process out of the crisis.…”
Section: Between Polarization and Consensusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 2011, Islamist parties won general elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, and they have since been the focus of much scholarly interest, as the introduction to this special issue shows. There have been numerous studies of Ennahda since then, with works examining its history (Wolf, 2017), the role of its members in keeping the organisation alive during the years of exile and clandestinity (McCarthy, 2018), its unique path to moderation as driven by its exclusion from the political sphere prior to 2011 (unlike other Islamist parties elsewhere: see Cavatorta & Merone, 2013), its economic agenda and policy proposals (Ben Salem, 2020;Cimini, 2017), as well as its record in power (Guazzone, 2013), among many others. While these works have been incredibly important in revealing the behavioural and ideological changes within Ennahda, they have had two limitations: their focus has been almost exclusively domestic; and they have drawn, implicitly or explicitly, on the moderation framework, commonly interpreted as a departure from the original Muslim Brotherhood (MB)'s guiding principles for a shift towards a liberal democratic agenda.…”
Section: Moderation or Self-limitation? A New Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%