Preface | xix of surveillance and policing. Thus, from March onwards in 2020, largescale protest activities stopped in many states.However, this temporary halt in what had been a resurgent crescendo of activism will not last. In many countries, the coronavirus crisis exposed severe deficits of governance in terms of income inequality, underachieving educational systems, and overloaded healthcare facilities. Indeed, it was partly because many rulers had such little excess infrastructural capacity that their lockdowns were so strict and harsh, for even a minor uptick in infections and deaths would have overwhelmed their social service provisions. The crisis has also grounded the regional economy. Key sectors required by all but the richest oil-exporting economies, such as worker remittances, tourism receipts, and informal businesses, suffered devastating immobility. Even the most optimistic estimates suggest it will take another one to two years for economic growth to return to pre-pandemic levels.Once the pandemic subsides, popular forces will again struggle toward familiar goals regarding social justice, economic fairness, and political rights. New moments of reckoning loom. When that transpires, ruling elites must have better answers than instructing their societies to wait for better circumstances, or to warn about the menace of violence and conflict should their authoritarian grasp upon power dissolve. These represent old excuses that no longer hold water.The resulting process of change that awaits will be protracted, un predictable, and sometimes painful. But it will nonetheless still be one of change, not continuity. As this volume makes clear, history continues to rewrite itself in the Middle East and North Africa.1. We use this term critically and with recognition of its limitations. See, for example, Gelvin (2012,(32)(33).