Insincere negotiation: Using the negotiation process to pursue non-agreement motives

Kang, Polly; Anand, K; Feldman, Pnina; Schweitzer, Maurice E.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2020.103981

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Our model highlights that an impasse is not necessarily a negative outcome of failed negotiations (see also Kesner & Shapiro, 1991) but—in the case of wanted and forced impasses —can reflect a strategic outcome that is desired (Coursey, 1982; Kang, Anand, Feldman, & Schweitzer, 2020). Negotiators may see an impasse to communicate toughness to the broader market in order to extract greater concessions.…”

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confidence: 85%

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Schweinsberg

Thau

Pillutla

2021

Journal of Management

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Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomena worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators toward agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: If both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions), and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence that suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses.

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confidence: 85%

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Schweinsberg

Thau

Pillutla

2021

Journal of Management

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“…It is worth reemphasizing that my framework explains when and why actors fluidly shift between substantive and cynical negotiation behavior within a bargaining interaction. This differs from other explorations of bad-faith negotiation that assume that an actor's type is fixed throughout (Kang et al 2020).…”

Section: High Movement High Costs: Violent Shiftsmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…In the domain of international mediation, Richmond (1998) speaks of “devious objectives” (707), and Danneman and Beardsley (2020) refer to “insincere bargaining” (190). Studies of business have mentioned “duplicitous negotiations” (Anand et al 2009, 1), “insincere negotiations” (Kang et al 2020, 2), and “avoidance bargaining” (Wallihan 1998, 258), while scholars of law and psychology have conducted research on “false negotiations” (Glozman et al 2015, 671). Work on bargaining by Stasavage (2004) explores the possibility that negotiators in public settings may “posture” (668), adopting extreme positions that undermine agreement if it helps signal policy alignment with their home constituents.…”

Section: Characterizing Wartime Diplomacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Painful Words: The Effect of Battlefield Activity on Conflict Negotiation Behavior

Min

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How does battlefield activity affect belligerents’ behavior during wartime negotiations? While scholars have studied when and why warring parties choose to negotiate, few insights explain what negotiators do once seated at the table. I argue that actors engage in obstinate negotiation behavior to signal resolve when undergoing contentious and indeterminate hostilities. I explore this claim by analyzing all negotiation transcripts and associated daily military operations reports from the Korean War. Using text-based, machine learning, and statistical methods, I show that high levels of movement or casualties in isolation produce clear information on future trends, thus yielding more substantive negotiations, while more turbulent activity featuring high movement and casualties in tandem produces cynical negotiations. Moving past contemporary literature, this study explores micro-level dynamics of conflict and diplomacy, builds a theoretical bridge between two perennial views of negotiation, and provides a framework for studying war by applying computational methods to archival documents.

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