Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation

Eckert, Heather

doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(03)00079-2

Cited by 95 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Harrington 1988, Nyborg and Telle 2006, Rousseau 2007, as well as some indication that EPAs provide violators with warnings, thus only sanctioning offenders that fail to comply upon detection (e.g. Russell 1990, Nyborg and Telle 2004, Eckert 2004, Rousseau 2009). In these cases, being audited increases the perceived probability of future audit and sanctions and thereby raises the incentives for compliance in the future.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Regulations: Lessons from a Natural Field Experiment in Norway

Telle

2012

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm's subsequent compliance substantially.Keywords: environmental regulation, enforcement, EPA, natural field experiment, random assignment JEL classification: K42, C93, Q58, D21, H41 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Karine Nyborg, Sandra Rousseau and Jay Shimshack, as well as participants at several seminars, for encouraging and helpful comments. I am grateful to the Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency (Klima-og forurensningsdirektoratet) for outstanding cooperation on this project, and I would particularly like to thank Inger Marie Haaland, Line Telje Høydal, Gro Hagen, Einar Knutsen, Cecilie Kristiansen, Ragnhild Orvik and Anne Marie Mo Ravik. The usual disclaimer applies. Address

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confidence: 99%

Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Regulations: Lessons from a Natural Field Experiment in Norway

Telle

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…Friesen (2003) expands on resourcing and the cost of enforcement, predicting that a regulated entity will only comply with a regulation when compliance costs are lower than the expected penalty for violation. Frequent monitoring and strict enforcement strategies, including high fines, are often proposed as solutions (Friesen 2003;Wu 2009). Eckert (2004, Earnhart (2004) and Rousseau (2008) all confirmed the deterrent effect of increasing inspections.…”

Section: Observed Constraints On Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand’s public conservation lands

Brower¹,

Heijs²,

Kimani³

et al. 2018

NZ J Ecol

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This article assesses compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand's conservation land. Of the 261 Department of Conservation (DOC) concessions for commercial activity searched, only about 15% included compensation provisions. A sample of 20 concessions of that 15% suggests 68% achieve full compliance. Our results suggest compliance is influenced by factors such as habitat and activity type, protected area category, and whether a concession holder has pending concessions and/or renewals. Inconsistencies in compliance monitoring, enforcement, and reporting merit attention. Although New Zealand's rate of full compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions is higher than that observed in other countries, compensation is rarely requested. This rarity and the lack of national guidelines on how and what to ask for in compensation, suggest that compliance with compensation once requested, and the quality and consistency of requests, limit biodiversity protection. Jurisdictions engaging in biodiversity compensation should attend not just to compliance, but also to the requests themselves. To do so, they should develop clear guidelines, enforcement strategies, and reporting processes.

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“…A few studies explore specific deterrence within a broader context of deterrence but do not investigate (or even discuss) the mechanism behind specific deterrence (Earnhart, 2004a;Earnhart, 2004b;Shimshack and Ward, 2005;Earnhart and Glicksman, 2011). The remaining empirical studies on the effects of imposed penalties on particular regulated entities ignore the elements of both specific and general deterrence (e.g., Eckert, 2004).…”

Section: Specific Deterrencementioning

confidence: 99%

Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario

Earnhart

Friesen

2013

Environ Resource Econ

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This study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters -likelihood and severity -and the experience of being penalized. In order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities, e.g., measuring entities' beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties, our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. This choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results. Based on a variety of statistical methods, our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence, whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior.

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Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation

Cited by 95 publications

References 22 publications

Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Regulations: Lessons from a Natural Field Experiment in Norway

Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Regulations: Lessons from a Natural Field Experiment in Norway

Compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand’s public conservation lands

Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario

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