Institucionalna in zasebna religioznost v severovzhodni Sloveniji. Primerjalna analiza slovenskih regij po letu 1969

Abstract

Category: 1.01 Original scientific paper Language: Original in Slovenian (Abstract in Slovenian and English, Summary in English) Key words: religion, northeast Slovenia, statistical regions, privatization of religion Abstract: A comparative analysis of religiosity across Slovenian statistical regions was conducted based on the survey data from the Slovenian Public Opinion project (SPO). It took into consideration available data from 1969 to 2016 and compared four regions of northeast Slovenia (Pomurska, Podravska, Koroška and Savinjska) with other regions in the country. Special attention was devoted to the thesis on privatization of religion in (post)modern societies, as well as to a more general thesis of secularization. Results of the analysis showed that fluctuations in religiosity in Slovenia as a whole were compatible with some previous observations: Until 1978, there was a significant decline in religiosity. This trend then reversed and revitalization of religion took place up until early 1990s. Since then, during the post-socialist period, religiosity did not change much in any direction. The crucial observation within these fluctuations is that the specific features of northeast regions endured through the entire observed period. These specific features are visible mostly in terms of relatively high levels of religiosity in general, as well as in very high levels of institutional religiosity and relatively low levels of private religiosity.

Religiosity as a predictor of students' political attitudes

“…This decline is most visible in Church participation, the importance of religion in an individual's life, and the decline of trust in the Church (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019). Similar trends have been observed among young people (Lavrič, 2019) and students (Boneta, 2016). Ilišin (2014) concluded that students are a relatively homogeneous category in which the majority accepts basic liberal‐democratic principles and considers extreme right‐wing views unacceptable.…”

“…With regard to the general but also Croatian secularization trend, especially among young people (Croccket & Voas, 2006; Lavrič, 2019), the relevant question is to what extent are the consequences of RS in childhood, but also of attending religious education until recently, present in actual religiosity in student age?…”

“…The authors found "the strongest link of political self-identification with the variables of religiosity because, with the increase in religiosity, the classification on the left decreases, and the one in the center and on the right increases" (Boneta & Mrakovčić, 2021, p. 69). Lavrič (2019Lavrič ( , 2021 detected structural and ideological (political) polarization as the reverse side of growing secularization among young people in Croatia.…”

“…The authors found “the strongest link of political self‐identification with the variables of religiosity because, with the increase in religiosity, the classification on the left decreases, and the one in the center and on the right increases” (Boneta & Mrakovčić, 2021, p. 69). Lavrič (2019, 2021) detected structural and ideological (political) polarization as the reverse side of growing secularization among young people in Croatia. The consequence of secularization is the worldview homogenization of the two extreme categories (atheists and convinced believers) and the strengthening of the gap in their political and worldview attitudes.…”