Institutional barriers to a ‘perfect’ policy: A case study of the Senegalese Rural Electrification Plan

Abstract

Abstract:This paper investigates the political and institutional factors that have influenced the success of the Senegalese Rural Electrification Action Plan (Plan d'Action Sénégalais d 'Électrification Rurale, PASER). PASER is of interest because its innovative design attracted extensive offers of finance from donors and independent power providers, however it has had limited effect on electrification levels. This paper examines PASER's progress and problems in detail, with the aim of informing rural electrification policy internationally.An extensive literature review was combined with 26 semi-structured stakeholder interviews, to produce a snapshot of the Plan's status after its first decade of operation. PASER's experiences are compared with other reform-based rural electrification initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa.PASER has faced significant institutional and political barriers, with delays arising from organisational opposition, inconsistent ministerial support, protracted consultations and the inherent challenges of implementing an innovative policy framework in a country with limited institutional capacity. The development of human and institutional capacity has been compromised by inconsistent political commitment. Such experiences mirror those of electrification initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst PASER's successes in garnering external support and fundraising are noteworthy and won praise from early reviews, in terms of delivery the Plan has failed to resolve common institutional barriers.

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