Institutional Change, Economic Conditions and Confidence in Government: Evidence from Belgium

Anderson, Cameron D.

doi:10.1057/ap.2008.21

Cited by 22 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In 2004, the question had a list of problems that respondents could choose from. 9 Specific question wording through waves: ÔAs of today, is (the most important problem) mainly dealt with by regional, national, or European political authorities?Õ (2004 and2009) and ÔAs of today, at which level do you think (the most important problem) is dealt with?Õ (2014). 10 Descriptive statistics on the distribution of our dependent variable by institutional context are provided in the online appendix.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Education is an ordinal variable that takes the value of 0 for respondents with 0 to 15 years of education, 1 for respondents with 16 to 19 years, and 2 for those with 20 or more years. 18 ÔAnd who do you think would be most appropriate to deal with (the most important problem) : regional, national, or European political authorities?Õ (2004 and2009) and ÔAnd at which level do you think (the most important problem) should be dealt with?Õ (2014). paper, and thus, they are not included in the reported tables.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period.…”

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Passing the buck? Responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies

León

Jurado

Madariaga

2018

West European Politics

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This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on individualsÕ causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period. 3 One of the most celebrated virtues of multilevel systems is better democratic governance. Indeed, classical normative theories state that multilevel governance helps to allocate power more efficiently to the most relevant level and enhance the control of governments by bringing them closer to citizens and overcoming informational asymmetries between representatives and represented. However, a more critical view stresses that vertical fragmentation of power makes the latter unable to establish a causal link between incumbentsÕ performance and outcomes, hampering their capacity to assign responsibilities. From this perspective, the peril of multilevel governance lies in that it makes voters less capable of attributing responsibility, weakening the rewardpunishment model and, in turn, electoral accountability.Certainly, individualsÕ capacity to assign responsibility between levels of government lies at the heart of the accountability mechanism of the reward-punishment model (Cutler 2004(Cutler , 2008 DŠubler et al. 2017). In this paper, the goal is to advance research on responsibility attribution by exploring responsibility judgements in multilevel systems. Building upon the political science literature on retrospective accountability and the social psychology literature on cognitive bias, the paper explores the role of party identification and attitudes towards the European Union in individualsÕ responsibility assignments, and tests for variation in this effect between different institutional contexts. In essence, the specific research questions are namely two: do group-serving biases in responsibility operate more intensely in multilevel systems than in countries with a unitary form of government? Do they operate more prominently in contexts where levels of governments are more consolidated?This paper provides new theoretical and empirical insights into the role of cognitive biases in responsibility attribution, with a particular focus in the variation between different institutional contexts. The first hypothesis assumes that multilevel 4 governance activates the use of cognitive bias in responsibility attribution, and th...

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Passing the buck? Responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies

León

Jurado

Madariaga

2018

West European Politics

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“…7 7 E.g., in a recent paper, Anderson (2009) analyses whether the impact of economic evaluations on central government support became weaker after the 1993 introduction of a federal constitution in Belgium. The author assumes that federalism involves a blurring of responsibility, but he does not specifically measure individuals' ability to ascribe responsibilities, or its variation over time. …”

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confidence: 99%

Who is responsible for what? Clarity of responsibilities in multilevel states: The case of Spain

León

2010

European Journal of Political Research

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There is a theoretical disagreement between the classical normative positive view on decentralisation, which states that the fragmentation of power shifts policy more closely into line with citizens' preferences, and a more recent critical view that states that decentralisation blurs attribution of responsibility. This disagreement can only be resolved by refining the understanding of specific institutional designs. The theoretical claim in this article is that the relation between multilevel governance and clarity of responsibilities is contingent upon the type of decentralisation in place. To test this proposition, individual data from an asymmetrically decentralised system – the Spanish State of Autonomies – are used. Results show that the relationship between decentralisation and clarity of responsibility has a u-shape. Responsibility attribution is clearer in regions with high and low levels of decentralisation, where one level of government clearly predominates over the other, than in regions with a more intertwined distribution of powers

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“…Another example is New Zealand, which changed from a single-member plurality system into a mixed-member proportional system in 1993, in so doing moving to a consensus type of democracy. In the same year, Italy abandoned the list-PR system in favor of a more majoritarian system (see Renwick 2008;Shugart and Wattenberg 2001;Katz 2001), while more recently, Ireland moved away from a majoritarian system (Bulsara and Kissane 2009; see also Anderson 2009 andSinardet 2010 on Belgium). 5 The debate over the pros and cons of various institutional arrangements has not only been expressed in political practice, but has also been dealt with in the academic literature (Rose 1992;Castles 1994;Crepaz 1996aCrepaz , 1996bBlais and Carty 1996;Linz 2000;Schmidt 2002;Taagepera 2003;Ganghof 2005;Fortin 2008;Aarts and Thomassen 2008;Müller-Rommel 2008;Vatter 2009;Flinders 2010;Sinardet 2010;Vatter and Bernauer 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which type of democracy performs best?

Doorenspleet

Pellikaan

2013

Acta Polit

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Which type of democracy performs best? While some scholars argue that an electoral system with proportional representation combined with a decentralized system works best, and that the type of electoral system is crucial (Lijphart 1999), others state that a proportional electoral system with a centralized (and hence not decentralized) system lead to better performance (Gerring et al. 2005;Gerring and Thacker 2008). Still other scholars claim that decentralization is crucial, particularly in countries with deeply divided societies (Norris 2008). In this article, we argue that Lijphart's earlier 1960s work needs to be combined with his more recent 1990s work, which results in an eightfold classification. This cube with eight different types of democracy not only enables us to compare the three rival claims in a systematic way, but is also a helpful tool for future studies focusing on types of democratic systems, and their origins and consequences. Our findings show that the type of electoral system is always crucial; the other two dimensions are crucial as well, though under different circumstances. In order to achieve the highest level of good governance, the best choice for the type of political system (centralization or decentralization) depends on the structure of the society (homogeneous or not). Centralization is best in homogeneous societies, while decentralization is best in heterogeneous societies. We recommend that future studies take into account all eight different types of democracy that can be distinguished based on Lijphart's theoretical arguments in earlier and later work.

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Institutional Change, Economic Conditions and Confidence in Government: Evidence from Belgium

Cited by 22 publications

References 22 publications

Passing the buck? Responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies

Passing the buck? Responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies

Who is responsible for what? Clarity of responsibilities in multilevel states: The case of Spain

Which type of democracy performs best?

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