Institutional Collective Action on Drugs: Functional and Vertical Dilemmas of Unused Pharmaceuticals

Abstract

The authors use the Institutional Collective Action Framework to analyze the barriers, opposition, and opportunities for residential pharmaceutical disposal programs in the United States via a case study on a series of take-back programs pioneered in the state of Washington by local and state governments, as well as the corresponding backlash from federal agencies. While successful in some ways, these innovative solutions directly challenged the competing federal policy regimes controlled by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and, to a lesser extent, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Findings from case studies suggest that functional dilemmas created by existing institutions with entrenched regulatory regimes are a key challenge to finding efficient solutions to vertical ICA dilemmas. Conclusions, then, connect to the broader ICA research agenda, and implications for multi-level governance issues.

Does self‐organizing policy network provide effective waste services? An empirical evaluation of institutional collective action and transaction cost dilemmas

“…In European countries, Bel and Sebő (2021) discovered that assigning cooperation governance to supra‐municipal governments enhances the effectiveness of inter‐municipal cooperation. Examining U.S. residential pharmaceutical disposal programs, Hubbard and Fowler (2021) conclude that vertical dilemmas at subnational levels result from federal‐level functional ICA dilemmas. Similar occurrences seem to be present in the CIPP.…”

“…Lastly, a horizontal dilemma occurs when the performance of one unit's service does not align with its counterparts, imposing externalities on the latter(s) (Feiock, 2013), where actors may not recognize the effects of their actions on others (Carr et al, 2009). Institutional Collective Action dilemmas should be assessed, as they can exist across multiple dimensions and interact in ways that heighten challenges (Hubbard & Fowler, 2021). Feiock (2013) emphasizes that addressing ICA dilemmas inevitably involves TCs, including the search for and processing of information, as well as negotiations between parties.…”

“…Kim et al (2020) suggest that examining various levels of ICA dilemmas and their combinations could be a valuable area of research for scholars in this field. The ICA approach offers valuable insights into alternative solutions for policy challenges (Hubbard & Fowler, 2021). While regional institutions can help overcome collaborative challenges in potential economic development (Hawkins et al, 2016), transaction costs (TCs) associated with policy implementation may lead to inefficient public policy outcomes (Williamson, 1981).…”

How do interests, ideas, and institutions affect multisectoral governance? The case of tobacco governance in two Pacific small island developing states

“…To investigate institutional conditions, we drew on the institutional collective action (ICA) framework (Hubbard & Fowler, 2021) and the administrative process theory (Croley, 2008). These two theories belong to the rational choice institutionalist scholarship (Bell, 2011), arguing that calculated interests drive decisions within institutions.…”

“…These two theories belong to the rational choice institutionalist scholarship (Bell, 2011), arguing that calculated interests drive decisions within institutions. The ICA framework examines the political and institutional structures that influence how actors can work together to achieve policy coherence (Hubbard & Fowler, 2021). The administrative process theory helps us to understand whether such structures are conducive for creating a level playing field in tobacco governance among stakeholders (Croley, 2008).…”