Institutional Corruption and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

English, William

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2281305

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Según el autor, el origen de la crisis en la región se halla en la permanencia de patrones de desigualdad social, exclusión, distribución de riqueza ineficiente y una explícita y visible corrupción. English (2013) sostiene que la corrupción es una amenaza interna que fractura los mecanismos de transparencia del poder (p. 6). En ese sentido, la corrupción política es una especie de "implosionador" de la democracia, pues afecta el crecimiento económico, la capacidad estatal y la redistribución de la riqueza, promueve la fuga de cerebros [117] ¡No nos representan!…”

Section: Crisis De La Democracia Y Corrupciónunclassified

¡No nos representan!: análisis comparado de la relación democracia y corrupción en Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y Ecuador 2015-2018

2022

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El artículo compara las correlaciones entre la democracia y la corrupción en cuatro países de América Latina: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y Ecuador, entre 2015 y 2018. Los casos estudiados llevaron entre 2018 y 2020 a una serie de manifestaciones sociales que expresan una crisis de representación, además de diversos hechos de corrupción; no obstante, los cuatro son diferentes en cuanto a sus procesos de construcción y consolidación democrática, así como en la valoración de la corrupción política como problemática relevante. A través de una metodología cuantitativa y la política comparada, se concluye que, a pesar de las similitudes y las diferencias entre los casos objeto de estudio, en términos de legitimidad y confianza todos presentan una tendencia hacia la desdemocratización.

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Section: Crisis De La Democracia Y Corrupciónunclassified

¡No nos representan!: análisis comparado de la relación democracia y corrupción en Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y Ecuador 2015-2018

2022

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“…These include studies exploring the phenomenon in relation to legislative bodies (Callen & Long, 2015;Thompson, 1995), pharmaceutical companies (Light et al, 2013;Rodwin, 2012), health care service providers (Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015), financial organizations (Youngdahl, 2013), education (Milanovich, 2014), and others. There are also studies exploring the effect of institutional corruption on the functioning of liberal democracy in general (English, 2013), political systems (Draca, 2014), electoral processes, and political parties (Lessig, 2014;Thompson, 1995). Fewer studies analyze the phenomenon in the context of private sector development (Salter, 2010).…”

Section: Institutional Corruption and State Fragilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Labor unions and institutional corruption: The case of Kazakhstan

Akhmetzharov

Orazgaliyev

2021

Journal of Eurasian Studies

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In this study, we used the institutional corruption framework to analyze the evolution of labor unions in Kazakhstan. As a research method, we conducted a case study by combining document analysis with survey data covering (n)1,200 respondents across all 14 regions of the country. Our findings suggest that external and internal influences weakened labor unions and diverted from fulfilling their primary purpose of promoting interests of their members. External influences, represented by restrictive regulatory framework and state intervention, create conditions of limited independence of labor unions leaving them extremely narrow scope to operate in. Internal influences are represented by disagreements and conflicts between national-level labor unions. This article stipulates that dysfunctional and institutionally corrupt labor unions in Kazakhstan serve as an indicator of state fragility. The findings confirmed that institutional corruption of labor unions has an adverse impact on public trust, while a frequent occurrence of labor conflicts might impact political risk factors, contributing to increased state fragility.

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“…In turn, those productive asset owners are dependent on public officials to provide the political and social foundations for stable markets, including the practices necessary to calm or channel the occasional restiveness of the populace when economic disruptions occur (Elkin, 1985). If dual dependency constitutes systemic corruption, then liberal democracy is corrupt to its roots, and attempts to reinvigorate "liberal ethics" (English, 2013) might be at best of marginal value. Indeed, underestimating "the importance of morally ambiguous or worse motives-and the political processes built on them-for sustaining a regime of popular self-government built around deliberation" (Elkin, 2004, p. 64) might make matters worse by giving us little purchase for considering design changes short of throwing the baby out with the bath water.…”

Section: Is the System Corrupt?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State

Cook

2015

The American Review of Public Administration

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The worries American citizens express about the distorting influence of minority factions, or special interests, on public governance are as old as the republic. I briefly recount the constitutional design flaws and developmental changes that have combined to make these worries more valid than ever in an age of administratively centered governance. I then review the evidence on the nature and extent of special interest influence on the administrative process from a broad swath of scholarship. After noting the limited efficacy of attempts to limit special interest influence via minor tinkering with the separation of powers, I argue for more fundamental structural change in the form of administration as a separate, constitutionally recognized element of the separation of powers. I outline basic structural features and offer hypothetical yet plausible consequences of such a design change. The latter, I contend, are amenable to confirmation or refutation through systematic analysis of evidence that is already available from past and current governing experience.

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Institutional Corruption and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

Cited by 4 publications

References 7 publications

¡No nos representan!: análisis comparado de la relación democracia y corrupción en Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y Ecuador 2015-2018

¡No nos representan!: análisis comparado de la relación democracia y corrupción en Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica y Ecuador 2015-2018

Labor unions and institutional corruption: The case of Kazakhstan

Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State

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