Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Stroh, Alexander; Heyl, Charlotte

doi:10.5129/001041515814224453

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…For most researchers, politics in Africa remains characterised by the coexistence of informal and formal institutions: "big men politics" on the one hand and some progress towards more rulebound politics on the other, although the former is often assumed to dominate the latter. 4 The tension between the two is put into relief by studies that explicitly address the rule of law (Fombad 2016;Stroh and Heyl 2015).…”

Section: Term Limits and The Institutionalisation Of Power Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa

Tull

Simons

2017

Africa Spectrum

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In Africa, a seemingly growing number of attempts by presidents to overcome or abrogate term limits, or make them otherwise ineffective, has ignited a debate about the significance of constitutional engineering, and its implications for the rule of law, democracy, and the nature of politics in general. In light of recent instances of “third-term bids,” we revisit the hypothesis about the institutionalisation of power in Africa and challenge the assumption that, over the past two decades, African politics have experienced a fundamental change away from “big man” rule towards the rule of law. Based on a comprehensive stocktaking of the state of play of term limits and third-term bids, we analyse broader trends and outcomes of legal and constitutional engineering. We argue that an analysis focusing exclusively on formal institutions and procedures misrepresents the extent of political change by ignoring power and authority in many African countries. While the growing salience of formal institutions is undeniable, we suggest that they matter more as a legitimisation of the power of political leaders than as a constraint to it.

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Section: Term Limits and The Institutionalisation Of Power Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa

Tull

Simons

2017

Africa Spectrum

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“…Après les réformes des années 1990, certains éléments de l'architecture française ont été introduits à différents degrés dans les systèmes judiciaires des anciennes colonies. Une étude récente, conduite par Stroh et Heyl (2015) s'est penchée sur le degré de concordance de la structure du contrôle de constitutionnalité des anciennes colonies françaises avec le modèle français avant la réforme intervenue en 2008 (voir tableau 1.2 Remarques : l'indice s'appuie sur 11 paramètres différents portant sur l'architecture institutionnelle d'une instance indépendante chargée du contrôle de constitutionnalité. Parmi ces paramètres, la structure du Conseil constitutionnel en France (avant la réforme de 2008) a été comparée à celle qu'ont adoptée neuf pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest francophone.…”

Section: L'influence Des Systèmes Juridiques Sur L'architecture Des Iunclassified

Les juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique de l’Ouest : Analyse comparée

Böckenförde¹,

Kante²,

Ngenge³

et al. 2017

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“…The reason why competition should be associated with independence in the non‐democratic context is that, fundamentally, the electoral logic of strategic accounts of judicial independence is about the risks of no longer being in power and expectations about the probability of losing power. This is true across various strands of strategic models in democratic contexts, from those focusing on how balances of power during constitution‐drafting affect structures (Ginsburg ; Stroh & Heyl ) to those assessing how variation in levels of electoral competition over time map onto de facto independence (Ramseyer ; Aydin ) . When opposition political groups present credible electoral threats, rational politicians in power will establish or maintain independent judiciaries because they are an effective and inexpensive minoritarian institution ,…”

Section: Competition Independence and Non‐democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an examination of the interaction between diffusion and electoral explanations, see Stroh and Heyl ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies

Epperly

2016

European J Political Res

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This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when present. This is examined via hierarchical and fixed effects models that show competition strongly associated with increased levels of independence. This relationship is robust to alternative model and data specification, and has strong out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy.

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Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Cited by 18 publications

References 11 publications

The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa

The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa

Les juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique de l’Ouest : Analyse comparée

Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies

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