2017
DOI: 10.1111/beer.12142
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Institutional investors as stewards of the corporation: Exploring the challenges to the monitoring hypothesis

Abstract: The study explores the challenges UK-based institutional investors face when trying to monitor investee companies and influence their social, environmental, and governance practices. Consistent with previous research, I find that misalignment of interests within the investment chain and dispersed ownership are factors which inhibit investor activism. However, other underexplored challenges include lack of investee company transparency and investor experience in activism, as well as low client demand for engage… Show more

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Cited by 32 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 89 publications
(120 reference statements)
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“…Institutional directors on boards represent dominant investors, such as institutional investors. According to the agency theory, these investors become actively involved with management activities, leaving their passive roles regarding the supervision of managers (Ivanova, ). Additionally, institutional investors constitute one of the most important elements in the corporate decision‐making process (Ruiz‐Mallorqui & Santana‐Martín, ).…”
Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institutional directors on boards represent dominant investors, such as institutional investors. According to the agency theory, these investors become actively involved with management activities, leaving their passive roles regarding the supervision of managers (Ivanova, ). Additionally, institutional investors constitute one of the most important elements in the corporate decision‐making process (Ruiz‐Mallorqui & Santana‐Martín, ).…”
Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The institutional investors may simply sell their shares and exit the firms rather than monitoring because the monitoring cost involved may exceed the benefit. Besides, they may face several impediments that hinder their ability to monitor, such as liquidity concerns, free rider problems and internal conflict of interests (Cvijanović, Dasgupta, & Zachariadis, 2016;Ivanova, 2017;McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016). In addition, they may lack knowledge and experience of how to effectively engage with the investee firms.…”
Section: Panel Regression Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another reason that encouraged a qualitative, interview‐based exploration was that the majority of cross‐cultural studies have been based on questionnaire surveys implicitly rooted in North American cultural values (Segalla, Fischer, & Sandner, ). The third reason that supported the methodological choice is grounded in the fact that qualitative interviews are an established approach in the business ethics research (Gillespie, Hybnerova, Esmark, & Noble, ; Ivanova, ; Lehnert, Craft, Singh, & Park, ; Moosmayer, Niemand, & Siems, ). The study drew on the epistemology of social constructivism (Kukla, ) and employed a discursive method.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%