Institutional Manifestations of Accessiblity and Urban Economic Development Polity

Inter-Jurisdictional Economic Development: A Political Institution Explanation for Policy Choice

“…The local contextual variables are derived from the survey and the Decennial Census. Economic characteristics, such as fiscal issues (Sharp, 1991), unemployment (Olberding, 2009), and demographic characteristics, particularly the proportion of the population that is minority (Rubin, 1986), have been shown to influence policy responses and development activity, including the decision to form an interjurisdictional agreement (Feiock et al, 2009).…”

“…For example, Sharp (1991) finds that the extent to which distress drives development policy is contingent upon the citizen participation arrangements and how insulated government officials are from the public. Moreover, policy decisions are associated with the time preferences of the public official and the service needs of the community (Steinacker, 2004).…”

“…Previous studies suggests that institutions matter in economic development (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1986;Sharp, 1991;Basolo & Huang, 2001) in which the pursuit of development is shaped by the risks, rewards, and opportunities of policymakers (Lewis, 1996;Feiock, Jeong, & Kim, 2003). Thus, since economic development takes place in a political marketplace and decisions reflect the strategic political position of policy actors, the choice to form a joint venture agreement may be strongly influenced by the local governing Downloaded by [Monash University Library] at 20:09 05 October 2014 HAWKINS institution.…”

Toward a Good Society in the Twenty-First Century

“…For example, Feiock and Cable ( 1992 ), building on the empirical work by Sharp ( 1991 ), found that the relationship between need and economic development policy "is stronger when the process is closed rather than open" (397). They defined economic development policy as the number of incentives offered to businesses, implicitly treated as the only type of policy available.…”

“…Thus, their results mean that poorer communities were likely to offer more incentives to businesses when there is a lack of participation in the development process. Likewise, Sharp ( 1991 ) offers a list of economic development policies under study-"ranging from loans, tax abatements, and other financial incentives to infrastructure improvements, zoning reform, and promotional activity" (129), otherwise known as "corporate welfare" (Weinbaum 2004 , 34)-and investigates differences in the application of these policies, not questioning whether the policies are the best ones to address community problems. Feiock and Kim ( 2000 ) addresses the role of democracy, arguing that reformed governments (more insulated from political elections) issue development policy more responsive to economic interests while unreformed governments (less insulated from political elections) are more likely to be influenced by political incentives-but this chapter also fails to question the nature of economic development policy in the first place.…”