Institutional obstacles to African economic development: State, ethnicity, and custom

Egalitarian norms, economic development, and ethnic polarization

“…It explains, for example, why the Kikuyu were able to profit most from the emerging land market in Kenya (Knox et al, 1996). Moreover, colonial rulers shifted the political power from existing centralized institutions such as kingship to local-level administration units that roughly coincided with ethnic areas (Bates, 1974;Platteau, 2009). Thus also the decentralized control over the distribution of the fruits of modernity promoted ethnic consciousness.…”

“…In Sub-Saharan Africa -the least modernized region -this indirect rule system has left a deep footprint. The relations of the local chiefs and headmen with the colonial state provided the former with official control over land and labor, and also resulted in clientage networks through which the opportunities for advancement were distributed on the basis of ethnicity (Berman et al, 2004, p. 5; see also Platteau (2009)). This is illustrated by the experiences of the Hutu (the vast majority in Rwanda and Burundi) and the Tutsi (see, e.g., Eller, 1999, Ch.…”

“…Communal networks of reciprocal relationships serve as a social security system and also guarantee the cooperative endeavor in the provision of public goods. The drawbacks of egalitarian norms often become apparent when the underlying stationary conditions change (Boehm, 1993;Narayan et al, 2000, Ch.4;Platteau, 2000Platteau, , 2009Hoff and Sen, 2006). The strong moral sense of reciprocity values typically tends to make communities resistant to new opportunities that may improve the lives of many.…”

“…In the specific context of Africa, the influence of culture is even more pervasive because of the historic inability or unwillingness of central authorities to provide basic security to their people. This has not only weakened loyalties towards the state, but also strengthened the psychological ties and bonds of trust between individuals and their ethnic groups (Ekeh, 2004;Platteau, 2009).…”

Political structure as a legacy of indirect colonial rule: Bargaining between national governments and rural elites in Africa

“…While electoral motives are important, they do not represent all cases because even military regimes devolve their authority to rural elites. 8 This paper is also related to the literature on the roles of rural authorities in African societies (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007;Kasara 2007;Goldstein and Udry 2008;Platteau 2009;Glennerster et al 2010;Logan 2011;Aldashev et al 2012;Acemoglu et al 2013;Baldwin 2013;Fergusson 2013;Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). Among these works, the model proposed in this paper is closely related to that of legal dualism (formal vs customary courts) developed in Aldashev et al (2012) which analyzes how customary law responds to a change in statutory law.…”