Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Harhoff, Dietmar; Hoisl, Karin

doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.07.010

Cited by 96 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…This hides important heterogeneities based on patent quality: moderately cited patents (with 20 to 30 citations) generate a premium of around 20 percent in annual earnings, while highly cited patents receive an earnings premium of 30 percent three years after the grant. Harhoff and Hoisl (2007) use data for Germany, where the employer has the right to claim the invention and, if he does, needs to reasonably compensate the employee in proportion to the value of the invention. They also find that the share of the salary received as a compensation for an invention is highly skewed with a few top inventions doubling the inventor's salary.…”

Section: Citations-weighted Patentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors

Akcigit

Baslandze

Stantcheva

2016

American Economic Review

291

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We study the effect of top tax rates on “superstar” inventors' international mobility since 1977, using panel data on inventors from the US and European Patent Offices. We exploit the differential impact of changes in top tax rates on inventors of different qualities. Superstar inventors' location choices are significantly affected by top tax rates. In our preferred specification, the elasticity to the net-of-tax rate of the number of domestic superstar inventors is around 0.03, while that of foreign superstar inventors is around 1. These elasticities are larger for inventors in multinational companies. An inventor is less sensitive to taxes in a country if his company performs a higher share of its research there. (JEL F22, F23, H24, H31, J61, O31, O34)

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Section: Citations-weighted Patentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors

Akcigit

Baslandze

Stantcheva

2016

American Economic Review

291

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“…If an employer does not claim the invention, the inventor can file the application in his own name. See Harhoff and Hoisl (2007). research vs. private research) or the type of research (basic research vs. applied research).…”

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confidence: 99%

A policy insight into the R&D–patent relationship

2009

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Contrary to an accepted wisdom, this paper shows that cross-country variations in the number of patents per researcher do not only reflect differences in the propensity to patent but also signals differences in research productivity. We put forward and test an empirical model that formally accounts for the productivity and the propensity component of the R&D-patent relationship. The two components play an important role, as witnessed by the impact of several policies, including education, intellectual property and science and technology policies. Indicators based on domestic priority filings reflect research efforts and are primarily affected by varying propensities to patent. In contrast, international filings, especially triadic patents, rather capture variations in research productivity.Keywords: patent system; Patstat; priority filing, propensity to patent; R&D; research productivity; triadic Abstract Contrary to an accepted wisdom, this paper shows that cross-country variations in the number of patents per researcher do not only reflect differences in the propensity to patent but also signals differences in research productivity. We put forward and test an empirical model that formally accounts for the productivity and the propensity component of the R&D-patent relationship. The two components play an important role, as witnessed by the impact of several policies, including education, intellectual property and science and technology policies. Indicators based on domestic priority filings reflect research efforts and are primarily affected by varying propensities to patent. In contrast, international filings, especially triadic patents, rather capture variations in research productivity.

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“…Following the Grossman-Hart-5. For underinvestment and other incentive problems in firms when employees are the inventors but not the patent holders, see Harhoff and Hoisl (2004).…”

Section: Agency Resource Control and Equity Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency and Governance in Strategic Entrepreneurship

Audretsch¹,

Lehmann

Plummer

2009

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

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This paper aims to highlight the opportunity to contribute to our understanding of strategic entrepreneurship by exploring the construct through the lens of agency theory. In particular, we claim a fundamental link between a new venture's control of critical resources and the distribution of equity between the principal and agent. According to agency theory, assigning top executives ownership in the firm provides arrangements that are compatible with the incentives of the owners of the firm. This paper suggests that agency theory has special relevance when considered in a strategic entrepreneurship context. This is because the function of managers in entrepreneurial new ventures is fundamentally different from their counterparts in large established, incumbent corporations. While both types of managers have to provide managerial and organizational expertise, managers in entrepreneurial new ventures have an additional function that is essential to the competitive advantage and performance of the new venture-providing knowledge and human capital, which, in many cases, is intrinsically linked to the capital resources of the new venture. Our framework is tested using patent ownership as a proxy for both relationship-specific investments and indispensable human capital of the top manager of the new venture. The empirical results support the main hypotheses posited by the entrepreneurial governance model. In particular, patent ownership of the top manager significantly increases the percentage of equity held, while the number of patents held by the firm significantly decreases the percentage of ownership.

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Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Cited by 96 publications

References 23 publications

Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors

Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors

A policy insight into the R&D–patent relationship

Agency and Governance in Strategic Entrepreneurship

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