INSTITUTIONALIZING DISHONOUR IN PLATO'S LAWS

Abstract

Even a cursory reading of the Laws reveals a startling number of references to penalties such as dishonour, shame and even degradation. 1 Indeed, as we shall learn, notions of honour and dishonour were among the foundational principles of Magnesia. One form of dishonour that recurs is atimia, which, surprisingly, Plato did not include among the serious penalties set forth in his penal code. The latter include death, imprisonment, whipping, humiliation, fines and exile (855c, 890c, 949c). There is one exception, a passage in which Plato adds to the list the penalty of atimiai (890c: plural of atimia). This curious reference has been variously translated as 'deprivation of civic rights', 'degradation', or 'dishonors'. 2 Whatever the meaning of 890c, no citizen of Magnesia suffered the fate of countless Athenian citizens, who, as punishment for a long list of offences, including public debt, were totally disfranchised, losing their civic rights and being barred from Athens' political centre, the Agora. 3 Far from following Athens' example, Plato states very clearly that no Magnesian, even in exile, is to be totally atimos (855c: ἄτιμον … παντάπασι), deprived of all civic rights and privileges. 4 While atimia in the traditional sense may not be part of Plato's penal code, yet atimia and its cognates (ἄτιμος, ἀτιμάζειν) recur throughout the Laws. They are found in conjunction with loss of reputation, dishonour and disgrace, and, in many instances, with the removal of a specific right or privilege. What then does atimia signify and where does it fit in Plato's penal code? These questions point in turn to a larger issue: the uses of reputation in Magnesian society. For again even a cursory reading of the Laws reveals that forms of dishonour, including atimia, institutionalized in the Laws are more than mere penalties. Like their opposite, honour, they have important uses in regulating and sustaining Magnesian society.

Old Comedy, Public Intellectuals and the Origins of Dissent Communication: The Case of Aristophanes

“…95 89 Lewis 1996, 10. 90 Conversely, some historians, such as Humbert (1991), insist that the person sentenced to ostracism did not lose their prestige, which from the perspective of reputation management is paradoxical. Thus, the role of oral communication as public communication was crucial.…”

Drawing Rein: Shame and Reverence in Plato’s Law-Bound Polity and Ours

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