Institutions and Political Change: Working-Class Formation in England and the United States, 1820-1896

Hattam, Victoria

doi:10.1177/0032329292020002002

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Both were movements of agrarians, independent producers, and small manufacturers centered in the Midwest, plains states, and the South. Both rejected the "corporate liberal" program of development and trade concentrated in corporations, national markets, and a few urban metropoles, fighting instead for "producerist" or "regional republican" programs of decentralized development based in "cooperative commonwealths" of independent producers, farmers, regional markets, and self-governing communities (Berk, 1994;Goodwyn, 1978;Hattam, 1992;Voss, 1996). Both cast the problems facing those groups in terms of "combines," "trusts," and dependence on middlemen, railroads, and "Eastern interests."…”

Section: Context: Movements and Cooperative Forms In The Usamentioning

confidence: 99%

Movements as Political Conditions for Diffusion: Anti-Corporate Movements and the Spread of Cooperative Forms in American Capitalism

Schneiberg

2013

Organization Studies

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Addressing the spread of cooperatives in the early 20th-century US economy, this study analyzes the role of anti-corporate movements in the diffusion of politically contested organizational innovations. It finds that institutional change can rest fundamentally on the combination of standard diffusion processes and collective mobilization in support of new practices. Specifically, it finds that the Grange, a leading anti-corporate social movement, was a political condition for the diffusion of cooperative alternatives to corporations in American capitalism. Cooperatives evoked fierce opposition by corporate forces, suppressing the diffusion of cooperative forms. When the Grange was weak or absent, cooperative organization in states or sectors had weak or no effects on cooperative organization in other states or sectors. But when the Grange was present and increased in strength, it amplified and even made possible the diffusion of cooperatives across states and industries. These findings shed new light on the contentious transactions between movements, corporations, and non-governmental organizations, expanding existing work on the trajectories, tactics, and organizational effects of anti-corporate movements.

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Section: Context: Movements and Cooperative Forms In The Usamentioning

confidence: 99%

Movements as Political Conditions for Diffusion: Anti-Corporate Movements and the Spread of Cooperative Forms in American Capitalism

Schneiberg

2013

Organization Studies

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“…Anticorporate movements can pursue economic organization as an alternative to using the state against corporations, yielding conditional positive effects of movements for cooperative forms (Schneiberg 2002(Schneiberg , 2007. Anticorporate movements may abandon politics for private strategies and organization when political victories are subverted by corporate capture of courts or commissions (Clemens 1997;Hattam 1992). Activists often turn to cooperatives as a "third way" between markets and states or corporations, or as a way to organize outside established institutions (Rothschild-Whitt 1979;Ware 1989).…”

Section: Movements and Cooperative Forms: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Movements and Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporations in the American Insurance, Dairy, and Grain Industries

2008

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How do social movements promote diversity and alternative organizational forms? We address this question by analyzing how cooperative enterprise was affected by the Grange-a leading anticorporate movement in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. State-level analyses across three industries yield three findings. First, the Grange had positive effects on cooperatives and mutuals during the nineteenth-century populist struggles over corporate capitalism. Second, these effects were stronger where corporations counter-mobilized to block challengers' political efforts. Grangers pursued economic organization as an alternative to politics and in response to blocked political access. Third, the Grange continued to foster cooperatives even as populist revolts waned. It did so, however, by buffering cooperatives from problems of group heterogeneity and population change, rendering them less dependent on supportive communities and specific economic conditions. These findings advance research at the movements/organizations interface by documenting movement effects and by isolating different causal pathways through which mobilization, countermobilization, and political opportunity shape economic organization. The results also provide economic sociology with new evidence on how social structure moderates economic forces, and help revise institutional analyses of American capitalism by showing how cooperatives emerged as significant, rather than aberrant, elements of the U.S. economy.

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“…The most prominent response to what came to be known as "the labor question," or the problematization of labor, was a desire among many employers and prominent citizens to hone the means of repression (Isaac 2002;Reinders 1977;Shefter 1986). The judiciary, meanwhile, constituted the most prominent government actors, as they sought to define and enforce particular forms and standards of labor protests and behavior (see Hattam 1992;McCammon 1993a).…”

Section: Regime1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Striking Deaths” at their Roots: Assaying the Social Determinants of Extreme Labor-Management Violence in US Labor History—1877–1947

Lipold¹

2014

Social Science History

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The seven decades framed by the Great Railway Strike of 1877 and institutionalization of organized labor in the wake of World War II constituted a unique period of US labor relations, one that labor historians have identified as the most violent and bloody of any Western industrialized nation. Despite long-standing scholarly interest in the issues of labor-management conflict, however, important questions regarding the causes of extreme labor-management violence within the United States have never been adequately addressed. In this paper, I utilize a recently compiled and unique data set of American strike fatalities to statistically model the causes of extreme strike violence in the United States. The time-series evidence suggests that picket-line violence increased in association with (1) the struggle for and against unionization and (2) economic desperation associated with tightening labor markets. The results also both depict the stultifying effect of massacres and suggest that state support for labor's right to organize tended to decrease the likelihood of violence and vice versa. This paper not only thus provides fresh insights into classic questions, but also offers a basis for both transhistorical and international comparison.

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Institutions and Political Change: Working-Class Formation in England and the United States, 1820-1896

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Movements as Political Conditions for Diffusion: Anti-Corporate Movements and the Spread of Cooperative Forms in American Capitalism

Movements as Political Conditions for Diffusion: Anti-Corporate Movements and the Spread of Cooperative Forms in American Capitalism

Social Movements and Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporations in the American Insurance, Dairy, and Grain Industries

“Striking Deaths” at their Roots: Assaying the Social Determinants of Extreme Labor-Management Violence in US Labor History—1877–1947

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