Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle

Kiesewetter, Benjamin

doi:10.1086/680911

Cited by 51 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…This principle is widely discussed in the debate opposing actualism and possibilism about moral and deliberative 'ought'. 21 In particular, (A-OIC) is used as a premise in various arguments against actualism (e.g., Kiesewetter (2015), Zimmerman (2008, ch. 3)). 22 The same principle has been discussed in the literature on normative dilemmas.…”

Section: What We S Hould Le Arn From the Failure Of Prrmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have

Fassio

2018

Ratio

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Benjamin Kiesewetter has recently provided an argument to the effect that necessarily, if one has decisive reason to φ, then one has sufficient reason to believe that she herself has decisive reason to φ. If sound, this argument has important implications for several debates in contemporary normative philosophy. I argue that the main premise in the argument is problematic and should be rejected.According to this premise (PRR), necessarily, one can respond correctly to all the decisive reasons one has. I show that PRR is confronted with counterexamples and presupposes an implausible commensurability of all kinds of reasons. If so, the conclusion in Kiesewetter's argument doesn't follow. I also discuss further implications of my objections to PRR for a specific family of 'ought' implies 'can' principles and ability constraints on reasons, and the consequences that these could have for a number of contemporary debates in normative philosophy. K E Y W O R D S'Ought' implies 'can', Kiesewetter, normativity, reasons, responding to reasons Several philosophers have recently argued for bridge-principles relating different kinds of normative reasons. 1 These principles suggest deep connections between different normative domains and posit substantive epistemic constraints on the set of considerations that can count as normative reasons. Perhaps the most interesting and remarkable of these principles has been defended recently by Benjamin Kiesewetter. 2 Kiesewetter argues for the following claim about normative reasons (where φ here is a placeholder for an action, an omission or an attitude such as believing, feeling, fearing, approving and so on):

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Section: What We S Hould Le Arn From the Failure Of Prrmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the context of the actualism-possibilism debate, seeKiesewetter (2015) andZimmerman (2008, chap. 3) for arguments in favor of this principle, seeJackson and Pargetter (1986) for arguments against it.23 For arguments against (A-OIC) relying on considerations about dilemmas see, e.g.,Marcus (1980), Van Fraassen (1973,Williams (1965).…”

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On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have

Fassio

2018

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“…In recent years, normative transmission principles have received considerable attention (Broome 2013;Kiesewetter 2015;Kolodny Forthcoming;Raz 2011;Scanlon 2014;Schroeder 2009). Suppose that you have reasons to φ and that the only way to φ is by means of ψing, where φing and ψing are two distinct actions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

Werkmäster

2018

Philosophia

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This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics.

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“…I'm assuming here that given that having an IA is a necessary means to or element of inquiring, then if one ought not both have an IA and believe then one ought not both inquire and believe. I take it that if there's a general principle at work here it is closely related to the sort of “transmission principle” discussed in, e.g., Kiesewetter ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Inquiry and Belief

Friedman

2017

Nous

160

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In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.

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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle

Cited by 51 publications

References 27 publications

On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have

On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

Inquiry and Belief

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