Instruments of Government: Perceptions and Contexts

Linder, Stephen H.; Peters, B. Guy

doi:10.1017/s0143814x00007960

Cited by 380 publications

(259 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…On the issue of typologies, as pointed out most prominently by Howlett (for instance 1991), the ideas of scholars like Salamon (1981), Hood (1986), Doern and colleagues (Doern and Wilson 1974;Tupper and Doern 1981), and Linder and Peters (1989) each offer intriguing insights but also omit key elements possibly necessary for productive theory building. As of yet, these thought-provoking ideas have not been fully melded into a coherent and accepted approach.…”

Section: Policy Instruments In Theories Of Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective

1998

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A BST RA C T The concepts of policy instruments and policy networks have played important roles in recent theoretical development on public policy, as research in several nations attests. These notions, however, have largely been considered in isolation from each other. Here a simple typology of policy networks is used to help explain the selection of different kinds of instruments by governments. Several instrument characteristics are considered for the expected impact of network features on instrument selection, and a set of propositions is developed that matches degrees of network interconnectedness and cohesion with the choice of different kinds of instruments -such as regulations, subsidies, and covenants. Examples from different national and policy-sectoral contexts are used to indicate the plausibility of the argument. The article suggests that considering network attributes can be useful in understanding governments' choice of instruments and can strengthen extant discussions largely focused on such variables as learning and policy style.The two subjects of this article, policy networks and the choice of government instruments to be used to achieve policy objectives, have each received extensive attention by scholars. Nonetheless, the core ideas developed in each stream of research have been largely ignored in the other. 1 The purpose of the current article is to link these concepts as

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Section: Policy Instruments In Theories Of Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective

1998

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“…This marks a transition from the basic question of ''what policy instruments are'' (Hood 1986;Linder and Peters 1989;Vedung 1998;Salamon 1981Salamon , 2002Wuerzel et al 2013) to the more complex question of ''how a policy instrument is adopted'' by decision makers in order to solve a new policy problem or to deal with the ineffectiveness of existing policy solutions, or under the pressure of specific groups or constituencies demanding the adoption of their favourite policy tool. The main assumption here is that, as pointed out by the seminal study by Kirschen et al (1964), the intrinsic ''theoretical goodness'' of a policy instrument is not a sufficient condition for its selection by decision makers.…”

Section: Decision Makers' Choice Of Policy Instruments Is Constrainedmentioning

confidence: 99%

How policy instruments are chosen: patterns of decision makers’ choices

2016

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Policy instruments are a fundamental component of public policies. Policy instruments are often a result of mediation within the policy design process, whenever decision makers reshape existing instruments without introducing any real innovation. This results in imitation, layering and ambiguity in tool choice selection, and raises the theoretical problem of the logic according to which decision makers choose certain specific policy instruments rather than others. Decision makers may have different reasons for choosing certain specific instruments, although these reasons should be connected to the two main purposes of decision-making, that is, the search for effectiveness and the construction of a shared sense, a common acceptance. Thus, the choice of instruments is a question of potentially conflicting drivers that decision makers have to cope with within a specific decisional situation, when asked to solve those problems that have arisen. This paper examines this question and offers an analytical framework based on the two main factors in terms of which the selection of instruments is channelled and assessed: legitimacy and instrumentality. The boundaries created by how decision makers perceive these two dimensions mean that only four selection patterns can be chosen by decision makers: hybridization, stratification, contamination or routinization.

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“…• the governance discourse: for example, discourse on deregulation, effectiveness and efficiency promotes the use of market-based policy instruments (Böcher and Töller 2003;Liefferink 2006; Böcher forthcoming); • the actor's interpretation of the context-specific nature of the policy problem: for example, problems that are easily repaired (e.g., cleaning of rivers) can be solved by coercive instruments like legislation, but other regulatory approaches will be needed to handle complex and long-term problems like climate change (Böcher and Töller 2003); • the instrument culture the actor is a part of (Sinclair 1997) anti-authoritarian tradition, for example; and • the actor's expected gains (such as competitive advantage, discretion, flexibility or votes) (Linder and Peters 1989;Kichgässner and Schneider 2003;Howlett 2004;Barrett 2006; Böcher forthcoming).…”

Section: Reasons For Criticism Of Smart Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

2010

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When regulators are faced with practical challenges, policy instrument choice theories can help them find the best solution. However, not all such theories are equally helpful. This paper aims to offer regulators a better alternative to the current policy instrument choice theories. We will specifically address the shortcomings of ''smart regulation theory'' and present an alternative that keeps the best of that theory while remediating its weak points. Some authors (Böcher and Töller 2003;Baldwin and Black 2008) say that smart regulation theory does not address institutional issues, compliance typespecific response, performance-sensitivity and adaptability of regulatory regime. We have resolved these problems by merging the smart regulation theory with the policy arrangement approach and the policy learning concept. We call the resulting approach ''regulatory arrangement approach'' (RAA). The central idea of the RAA is to constrain the almost infinite ''smart'' regulatory options by: the national policy style; adverse effects of policy arrangements of adjoining policies; the structure of the policy arrangement of the investigated policy and competence dependencies of other institutions. The reduction can be so drastic that the potential governance capacity falls below the smart regulation threshold. In other words, no smart regulatory arrangement can be developed in that institutional context unless policy learning occurs. In addition, a ''smart'' regulatory arrangement is no guarantee that the policy will succeed. For this reason, the performance of the regulatory arrangement is measured and evaluated. Performance below a certain threshold indicates that the regulatory arrangement needs to be adapted, which then results in policy learning. 123Policy Sci (2010) 43:245-261 DOI 10.1007 We illustrate the usefulness of this new approach with a secondary analysis of the Flemish sustainable forest management policy.

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Instruments of Government: Perceptions and Contexts

Cited by 380 publications

References 26 publications

The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective

The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective

How policy instruments are chosen: patterns of decision makers’ choices

From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

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