Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq

Did Monetary Forces Help Turn the Tide in Iraq?

“…With most Iraqis unemployed, the prospect of a significant payment for an assassination is appealing even to those not deeply sympathetic to the Ba'athists. 3 How much cash is enough to hire an Iraqi mercenary? Early in the conflict, reports suggested that Iraqi and foreign mercenaries were accepting something between $150 and $1,000 per attack.…”

Impact of coalition and insurgent force levels on civilian deaths and injuries in Iraq, 2003–2005

“…Table 2 provides the framework within which the evolution of the insurgency is briefly reviewed, with a focus on the impact on civilians. This discussion draws heavily on the reviews by Beckett [8], Cordesman [9], Fallows [10] and Metz [11]. [10] points out, American strategists underestimated both the effort required to secure and stabilize Iraq and how quickly resentment of the occupation would lead to violence directed against coalition forces.…”

Articles: Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-insurgency Strategy in Iraq

“…40 As Steven Metz reminds us, 'An insurgency is born when a governing power fails to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, endemic corruption, crime, various forms of radicalism, or rising expectations'. 41 The reasons why the US administration failed to adequately plan for the immediate post-war environment seem to stem from the skewed perspective (evident in grand strategy) about how ordinary Iraqis would respond to the fall of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of their country by thousands of US and British soldiers. In addition, as James Fallows asserts, the US administration had plenty of information from experts about the likely post-conflict scenarios but these were 'warnings it chose to ignore'.…”