Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria 2017
DOI: 10.4324/9781315104287-4
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Insurgency-COIN military doctrine in Nigeria

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“…On March 14, 2014, Boko Haram insurgents overran and took control of the Headquarters of the 21 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, Borno State. After overrunning the counterinsurgency hub, the group took away military towed artillery such as Nigerian Army ZSU-23 quad-barrel antiaircraft tank and tactical vehicles used by the military in counterinsurgency operations in the North-East (Nwangwu & Ezeibe, 2019; Omeni, 2018c). Boko Haram asymmetric warfare has been incubated, entrenched, and sustained by several factors, most of which are not peculiar to Northern Nigeria.…”
Section: Dynamics Of Boko Haram (Counter)insurgency In North-east Nig...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…On March 14, 2014, Boko Haram insurgents overran and took control of the Headquarters of the 21 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, Borno State. After overrunning the counterinsurgency hub, the group took away military towed artillery such as Nigerian Army ZSU-23 quad-barrel antiaircraft tank and tactical vehicles used by the military in counterinsurgency operations in the North-East (Nwangwu & Ezeibe, 2019; Omeni, 2018c). Boko Haram asymmetric warfare has been incubated, entrenched, and sustained by several factors, most of which are not peculiar to Northern Nigeria.…”
Section: Dynamics Of Boko Haram (Counter)insurgency In North-east Nig...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Boko Haram insurgency continued and reached its zenith with the highest fatalities recorded between 2014 and 2015 (Figure 1), the period approaching Nigeria’s 2015 general elections. As Omeni (2018c) explained, Boko Haram within this period acquired or developed the capacity to violently engage the Nigerian military using advanced weapons and armor platforms, supported motorized infantry which is capable of organizing increasingly and effectively surprise attacks and counter-surprise attacks against military-led counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. Consequently, with the acquired military capability, Boko Haram could defend and control captured territory for a long period (Omeni, 2018c).…”
Section: Dynamics Of Boko Haram (Counter)insurgency In North-east Nig...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The insurgency, however, has evolved and adapted in response to the dynamics of the ongoing national and regional counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, scholars have assessed the successes and failures of these military operations (Omeni, 2017; Onapajo and Ozden, 2020; Onuoha et al, 2020) as well as other non-military responses to the insurgency (Bukarti and Bryson, 2019; NextierSPD, nd; Nwangwu and Ezeibe, 2019; Ogbogu, 2016; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020). However, an initiative of the Nigerian government that has attracted wide media coverage and public interest but marginal scholarly attention in the growing literature on the Boko Haram insurgency is the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) programme.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%