2021
DOI: 10.1787/ce813aa5-en
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Intangibles and industry concentration

Abstract: OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s). Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works. Comments on Working Papers are welcomed, and may be sent to

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Cited by 9 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Distributing intermediate trade dependencies according to shares in global gross output rather than shares in intermediate trade would fail to account for the fact that only a part of intermediate good output is available for trade since an important part is used in domestic production. 17 In a number of countries, these industries account for a significant share of GDP (e.g. motor vehicles in Canada, Korea, Mexico and the United States).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Distributing intermediate trade dependencies according to shares in global gross output rather than shares in intermediate trade would fail to account for the fact that only a part of intermediate good output is available for trade since an important part is used in domestic production. 17 In a number of countries, these industries account for a significant share of GDP (e.g. motor vehicles in Canada, Korea, Mexico and the United States).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Under current GVC dependencies, a tightening of mobility restrictions of 20 points on the Oxford stringency indicator in China (corresponding roughly to the tightening observed between early-March and early-April 2022) is simulated to reduce output in selected downstream industries to up to 4% (Figure 5). 17 Diversification of trade dependencies would have particularly large shielding effects on domestic output in many Asian countries and Mexico, reflecting their high ongoing reliance on Chinese upstream suppliers. By contrast, in the specific case of the simulated China shock, diversification would be much less beneficial, or even costly, for Canada and European countries, because current dependencies are lower than under the diversification benchmark.…”
Section: Mitigating the Risk Of Disruptions From Abroadmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Weights are not available in the version used for the current analysis, which covers 21 groups of sectors. 11 Data for Japan are collected by the 2020 Japanese National Innovation Survey and concern information on innovation activities of Japanese firms, which are asked in 2020 about technology use between 2017 and 2019. This survey covers firms with more than 10 persons employed and includes weights.…”
Section: Firm-level Surveys Across Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Les données économiques plus larges suggere que la concurrence sur les marchés du numérique tend à perdre en ampleur. Dans les pays de l'OCDE, les entreprises sont moins nombreuses à entrer sur les marchés et à en sortir (OCDE, 2021 [23] ; Bajgar et al, 2019 [24]) -un phénomène plus marqué encore dans les secteurs à forte intensité de numérique (Calvino et Criscuolo, 2019 [25]). Si les start-ups spécialisées dans le numérique attirent d'importants investissements en fonds propres et en capital-risque, elles sont de plus en plus souvent rachetées par des acteurs de plus grande taille, avant d'avoir pu croître et prospérer (Bajgar, Criscuolo et Timmis, 2021 [26]).…”
Section: Sécurité Numériqueunclassified