2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-41025-4_16
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Integrating Adversary Models and Intrusion Detection Systems for In-vehicle Networks in CANoe

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Cited by 6 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
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“…However, there was no defense mechanism proposed against the attacks. Unlike our study, which offers mitigation measures, the proposed testbed in [31] facilitates the investigation of the impact of adversarial examples on IDS; the software offers no room for testing mitigation measures. Although the work of [38] is on CAV, the study focus only considered vehicular ad-hoc networks using synthetic datasets and binary classification problems.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, there was no defense mechanism proposed against the attacks. Unlike our study, which offers mitigation measures, the proposed testbed in [31] facilitates the investigation of the impact of adversarial examples on IDS; the software offers no room for testing mitigation measures. Although the work of [38] is on CAV, the study focus only considered vehicular ad-hoc networks using synthetic datasets and binary classification problems.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Yang et al [23] demonstrate the vulnerability of deep neural networks for network intrusion detection system (NIDS) to adversarial examples using model substitution and black-box-based zeroth-order optimisation (ZOO) and generative adversarial network (GAN) attacks. In another study, a testbed consisting of an adversarial model embedded in the IDS was designed to facilitate security evaluation of CAN system design [31]. However, the developed tool provides no function for testing mitigation measures.…”
Section: Background a Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, there was no defense mechanism proposed against the attacks. Unlike our study, which offers mitigation measures, the proposed testbed in [27] facilitates the investigation of the impact of adversarial examples on IDS; the software offers no room for testing mitigation measures. Although the work of [28] is on CAV, the study focus only considered vehicular ad-hoc networks using synthetic datasets and binary classification problems.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Yang et al [23] demonstrate the vulnerability of deep neural networks for NIDS to adversarial examples using model substitution and black-box-based zeroth-order optimization (ZOO) and generative adversarial network (GAN) attacks. In another study, a testbed consisting of an adversarial model embedded in the IDS was designed to facilitate security evaluation of CAN system design [27]. However, the developed tool provides no function for testing mitigation measures.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This working scenario has also been considered by other works, e.g. [44]. For this, we configured inside the environment a CAN node to replay the genuine dataset and another node to inject malicious frames.…”
Section: A Setup For Off-line Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%