To obtain higher yields, farmers may excessively use pesticides when they grow crops (like rice, vegetables, or fruit), causing moral hazard behavior. This paper examines how Chinese farmers' moral hazard behavior in crop production is influenced by their traditional culture. A semi-parametric logistic model is used to investigate the impact of Chinese traditional culture on farmers' moral hazard behavior. The results reveal that Chinese traditional culture has a positive effect on ameliorating the farmers' excessive use of pesticides in crop production, which leads to a moral hazard in agro-product safety. Specifically, when we control for extraneous variables, the probability of moral hazard decreases by 15% if farmers consider their traditional culture in their production decisions. Moreover, the probability of moral hazard decreases by 17% if farmers consider the traditional culture as a powerful restraint regarding the use of pesticides. Our analysis provides some supportive evidence on the effect of Chinese traditional culture on mitigating farmers' excessive use of pesticides.2 of 15 economic activities, in order to maximize their own utility, will have inherent incentives to take actions unfavorable for others. As in the agro-products market, there is a principal-agent relationship between buyers and farmers, the buyers (such as agricultural enterprises, wholesalers, supermarkets, and the final consumers) are the principal, while the farmers are the agent. They sign a production contract (sometimes farmers may use certificates instead of contracts, like organic certificates), the buyers commission the farmers to produce agro-products with safe quality, and there are strict regulations on the application of pesticides, including variety, time, and dose. However, as farmers' behaviors cannot be monitored during the production period, in order to get greater yields, they may pursue activities unfavorable to buyers, such as increasing pesticide concentration, adopting banned pesticides, and using pesticides during the harvest period; with farmers' behaviors seriously violating the agreement of the contract, this is thought to be moral hazard behavior (MHB) [7]. Moral hazard hinges crucially on information asymmetry; therefore, the risk-taking party knows more about his (or her) intentions than the party paying for the consequences of the risk [8]. Given the quality information asymmetry in the agro-products market, farmers may excessively use pesticides in the pursuit of higher profits.Recently, there has been growing interest in studying farmer's MHB. Many analyses have been undertaken to uncover the factors affecting farmers' MHB devoted to crop production. In the literature, factors affecting farmers' MHB cover demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, level of education, risk preference, farmers' cognition, external environment of agricultural production, and characteristics of government regulation, among others [7,[9][10][11]. In China, the government plays a significant role in regulating and s...