Integrating Environmental Protection and EU Competition Law: Why Competition Isn't Special

Abstract

One of the biggest challenges facing environmental policy makers at present is that of integrating environmental protection goals into economic policy areas. Unless this is genuinely achieved, it is clear that environmental degradation will continue apace. Though one of the EU's most important areas of economic competence is competition policy, many policy makers and commentators reject the notion that environmental concerns should play a significant role in EU competition analysis. In that light, this article addresses two key questions. First, should this approach apply? Second, if not, what are the principles that govern how environmental protection requirements should be taken into account by decision makers applying EU competition law?In answering these questions, the article puts forward three theoretical arguments as to why, and how, the environmental benefits and damage flowing from goods and services should be taken into account by EU competition decision makers, based, respectively, on legal systematic, governance and economic reasoning.

Competition and Sustainability: an introduction

“…As particularly frequently cited elaborations the texts of Monti, 25 Quellmalz, 26 Roth, 27 Townley, 28 Kingston,29 and Monti/Mulder 30 have to be mentioned. In addition, there are many other contributions to the discussion.…”

The Right to Water and Sustainable Consumption in EU Law

“…These concerns were echoed by an OECD study according to which the excessive use of water and climate change will cause "one in every two people [to] live in water-stressed areas" by 2030. 8 Meanwhile, some areas of economic law still lag behind in the fight with these challenges (Kingston, 2010). Most visibly, consumer law has remained impervious to these innovations in international law (Twigg-Flesner & Micklitz, 2010) and, in particular, to environmental protection considerations (Luchs & Miller, 2015;OECD Study, 1991).…”

Doing Good Together: Competition Law and the Political Legitimacy of Interfirm Cooperation

“…9.The terminology of ‘economic’ versus ‘non-economic’ interests in this debate is unfortunate, since many of these non-economic interests could be represented in a broader welfarist calculus (for an example, see Kingston 2010, 798ff). It would be more accurate to speak of consumer welfare versus third-party welfare interests, but to avoid confusion, we will stick to the prevailing terminology.…”

“…17.In this context, the question is whether the exception clause can be broadly interpreted so as to include noneconomic interests. See for examples of the European legal literature around the topic Monti (2002); Cseres (2007); Townley (2008); Kingston (2010); Zimmer (2012); for the US context see Scott (2016). …”