Integrating Risk Preferences into Game Analysis of Price-Making Retailers in Power Market

Zhao, Chen; Sun, Jiaqi; He, Ping; Zhang, Shaohua; Ji, Yu

doi:10.3390/en16083339

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 34 publications

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“…Ref. [22] presents an equilibrium model for electricity retailers, using mean-variance utility theory to account for their risk preferences. Through theoretical analysis and the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, the paper investigates the effects of wholesale price uncertainty and risk preferences on bidding strategies and Nash equilibrium outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Industrial Power Users Considering Demand Response Differences in Master–Slave Game

Liu

Xing

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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With the deepening of power market reform, further study on power trading mechanisms has become the core issue of power market study. The development stage of the industrial electricity market requires efficient and flexible pricing mechanisms. Currently available pricing strategies are inadequate for demand response management. Therefore, this paper provides an in-depth study of the pricing mechanism in the industrial electricity market in the context of electricity market reform. It proposes a demand–response-based dynamic pricing strategy for industrial parks. The method proposes a dynamic pricing strategy for demand-side response in industrial parks based on master–slave game by establishing an exogenous model of demand-side response and incentives. Compared with the existing strategies, the strategy is more efficient and flexible, and effectively improves the economic efficiency of power trading and load regulation. Firstly, an exogenous model of demand-side response and incentive is built to characterize the demand-side response cost. The method focuses more on describing the exogenous characteristics of user incentives and response quantities. It only needs to analyze the exogenous indicators and random errors in various typical scenarios. The description of user demand-side response is more efficient. Secondly, a master–slave-game-based dynamic pricing strategy for industrial parks with demand-side response is proposed. The strategy is composed of a two-stage optimization. The primary regulation of customers is achieved by day-ahead time-of-use tariffs. The secondary regulation of customers is achieved by means of the same-day regulation of demand and purchase regarding clean electricity. The proposed two-stage price formation mechanism is more economical, more effective in load regulation, and improves the flexibility of industrial pricing. Finally, a case study is conducted on an industrial power user in a park in Liaoning Province. The results show that the proposed method is significantly better than existing methods in terms of improving the economic efficiency and load control effectiveness of the pricing strategy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Industrial Power Users Considering Demand Response Differences in Master–Slave Game

Liu

Xing

et al. 2023

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Research on the risk assessment of the power grid enterprises’ agency power purchase business in China: A hybrid multi-attribute decision-making framework based on FUCOM-F and GRA-MARCOS

Gan,

Zheng,

Chu

et al. 2024

Front. Energy Res.

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To steadily promote the reform of sales electricity prices, China has innovatively proposed to carry out grid enterprises’ agency power purchase business (GEAPPB) as a transitional scheme for industrial and commercial users to enter the power market in the future. However, because the GEAPPB covers a wide range of users and involves complex business processes, the risks throughout the process of the GEAPPB will affect the organization and operation of the business. This paper proposes a GEAPPB risk assessment technique. First, a risk evaluation index system containing 10 indicators is designed based on the characteristics and development process of GEAPPB. Second, a risk assessment model based on the fuzzy full consistency method (FUCOM-F) and gray relational analysis (GRA)-improved MARCOS is constructed. Finally, seven grid enterprises in China are taken as examples to verify the validity and scientificity of the model. The results show that improving the accuracy of power forecasting, optimizing the agency power purchase strategy, and strengthening demand response management are the key schemes to reduce the risk of GEAPPB. Compared with the other three evaluation models, the proposed model has good applicability and effectiveness for the risk evaluation of GEAPPB.

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Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Yu,

Zhang,

Cui

et al. 2024

Energies

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With the development of global clean energy and the implementation of carbon emission reduction policies, the direct purchase of electricity by large consumers has been increasingly promoted as a special form of electricity trading. Therefore, on the basis of the completion of low-carbon emission reduction targets in each country, how to rationalize the electricity purchase by large consumers in the electricity market so as to reduce their electricity purchase costs has become the main target of attention in each country. Currently, there are fewer studies in existing research on the direct electricity purchase strategy of large consumers under the consideration of the weight of consumption responsibility and risk. Based on this, this paper constructs a dual-game model for direct electricity purchase by large consumers based on the Stackelberg game and non-cooperative game theory. The concept of value at risk is further introduced, and the optimal strategy of direct electricity purchase by large consumers is proposed. The results of this study show that when market players make decisions on the purchase and sale of electricity, power suppliers will increase their biddings to obtain the highest returns, and large consumers can reduce the transaction costs by combining the medium- and long-term market with the spot market to purchase electricity. In the choice of electricity purchase market, with the increasing risk factor, large consumers shift from the risky spot market to the less risky medium- and long-term market and option market. This paper provides a reference for the issues of power suppliers’ contract bidding and large consumers’ electricity purchase strategy in the medium- and long-term contract transactions.

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Integrating Risk Preferences into Game Analysis of Price-Making Retailers in Power Market

Cited by 3 publications

References 34 publications

Study on Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Industrial Power Users Considering Demand Response Differences in Master–Slave Game

Study on Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Industrial Power Users Considering Demand Response Differences in Master–Slave Game

Research on the risk assessment of the power grid enterprises’ agency power purchase business in China: A hybrid multi-attribute decision-making framework based on FUCOM-F and GRA-MARCOS

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

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