2017 IEEE 18th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE) 2017
DOI: 10.1109/hase.2017.25
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Integrating Six-Step Model with Information Flow Diagrams for Comprehensive Analysis of Cyber-Physical System Safety and Security

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Cited by 19 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The developed tool provides a bidirectional transformation between joined AFT model and independent models The AFT model can be transferred to UPPAAL for quantitative analysis purposes, e.g., reliability. 31) Sabaliauskaite and Adepu (2017) [46] extend the sixstep model for design of safe and secure CPSs with support for identification of possible failures and cyber attacks. In the first two steps of the approach, the functions/requirements are defined together with the system architecture.…”
Section: ) Raspotning Et Al (2012) [10] Present Combined Harmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex [24], [32], [40], [45], [46] [11], [33] Unified [6], [13], [15], [17], [23], [25], [34], [36], [39], [41], [42], [43], [35], [49] [10], [12], [18], [21], [26], [28], [29], [31], [37], [38], [44], [47] failure model to address failure dependencies and trade-offs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections.…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The challenge, therefore, is to develop methods that can strike an appropriate balance between those two aspects of scalability, so that the analysis results in an appropriate and practically useful level of detail. • The majority (55) of the reviewed methods provide mechanisms to stimulate creativity among the analysts and other relevant stakeholders. As many methods rely, at least to some extent, on scenario development, creativity is an important characteristic.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%