Integrative Levels

Kleineberg, Michael

doi:10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…I have no argument toward the theory of levels of reality, although it should be recognized that there is no consensus on which layers exist, and how then can be identified and thus how disagreements may be solved (see Kleineberg, 2017 for a fine review). In fact, Hjørland (2002c) was a defense of a specific theory of psychological levels suggested by Leontyev (1981), which is based on monism (materialism) and thereby seems to solve some of the theoretical problems inherent in, for example, Popper’s metaphysics.…”

Section: Discussion Of Gnoli’s Metaphysical Standpointmentioning

confidence: 99%

The foundation of information science: one world or three? A discussion of Gnoli (2018)

Hjørland

2019

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Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to make a critical analysis of the views put forward by Claudio Gnoli (2018) in this paper concerning philosophical problems in library and information science (LIS). Design/methodology/approach-The paper presents the basic ideas in Gnoli (2018) and discusses the set of basic assumptions, concepts and conclusions put forward. Findings-It is argued that the idea of the theory of levels is basically sound, but we do not need to consider the material world, the mental world (minds) and the world of mentefacts as three different worlds. They represent different levels with different kinds of emergent properties in the world. Further, although the concepts of artifacts and mentefacts are useful, there are other terms within LIS, such as document, work and object that have been influential and should be discussed in this context. It is also argued that subjective vs objective knowledge is often confused with private vs public knowledge, which is problematic. Finally, it is claimed that the cognitive view and the "sociological view" are not about two different levels of reality but are competing views about the same reality. Originality/value-The paper clarifies some aspects of the analytical framework of domain analysis and adds to the developments of the philosophical dimensions of information within LIS.

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Section: Discussion Of Gnoli’s Metaphysical Standpointmentioning

confidence: 99%

The foundation of information science: one world or three? A discussion of Gnoli (2018)

Hjørland

2019

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“…Several authors, e.g. : Ridi (2016); Kleineberg (2017); Dahlberg (2017); Hjørland (2010), claim the lack of grounds for such positions, emphasizing that, in procedural terms, knowledge is both ontological and epistemological. As an area of study, ontology focuses on how reality is constituted and structured using concepts.…”

Section: The Aim and Scope Of The Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Can an Ontologically-Oriented KO Do Without Concepts?

Machado¹,

Simões²,

Gnoli³

et al. 2020

Knowledge Organization at the Interface

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The ontological approach in the development of KOS is an attempt to overcome the limitations of the traditional epistemological approach. Questions raise about the representation and organization of ontologically-oriented KO units, such as BFO universals or ILC phenomena. The study aims to compare the ontological approaches of BFO and ILC using a hermeneutic approach. We found that the differences between the units of the two systems are primarily due to the formal level of abstraction of BFO and the different organizations, namely the grouping of phenomena into ILC classes that represent complex compounds of entities in the BFO approach. In both systems the use of concepts is considered instrumental, although in the ILC they constitute the intersubjective component of the phenomena whereas in BFO they serve to access the entities of reality but are not part of them.1 During the 8th conference of the ISKO Spanish chapter (2017), as part of the proposals labeled as "the León manifesto." http://www.iskoi.org/ilc/leon.php (access on 8.1.2020).

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“…What is studied by LIS is especially knowledge about Chinese plates, while the discipline focusing on Chinese plates themselves is ceramic art. Confusion between the two has indeed been characterized as the "Chinese plate syndrome" (Classification Research Group, 1978 (Kleineberg, 2017). These views are not incompatible anyway, as they all seek to describe reality as a graduated series of ontical strata.…”

Section: Mentefacts As Objectivated Spiritmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mentefacts as a missing level in theory of information science

Gnoli

2018

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Purpose The current debate between two theoretical approaches in library and information science and knowledge organization (KO), the cognitive one and the sociological one, is addressed in view of their possible integration in a more general model. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach Personal knowledge of individual users, as focused in the cognitive approach, and social production and use of knowledge, as focused in the sociological approach, are reconnected to the theory of levels of reality, particularly in the versions of Nicolai Hartmann and Karl R. Popper (three worlds). The notions of artefact and mentefact, as proposed in anthropological literature and applied in some KO systems, are also examined as further contributions to the generalized framework. Some criticisms to these models are reviewed and discussed. Findings Both the cognitive approach and the sociological approach, if taken in isolation, prove to be cases of philosophical monism as they emphasize a single level over the others. On the other hand, each of them can be considered as a component of a pluralist ontology and epistemology, where individual minds and social communities are but two successive levels in knowledge production and use, and are followed by a further level of “objectivated spirit”; this can in turn be analyzed into artefacts and mentefacts. While all these levels are relevant to information science, mentefacts and their properties are its most peculiar objects of study, which make it distinct from such other disciplines as psychology and sociology. Originality/value This analysis shows how existing approaches can benefit from additional notions contributed by levels theory, to develop more complete and accurate models of information and knowledge phenomena.

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Integrative Levels

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

The foundation of information science: one world or three? A discussion of Gnoli (2018)

The foundation of information science: one world or three? A discussion of Gnoli (2018)

Can an Ontologically-Oriented KO Do Without Concepts?

Mentefacts as a missing level in theory of information science

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