Integrative pluralism for biological function

Abstract

We introduce a new type of pluralism about biological function that, in contrast to existing, demonstrates a practical integration among the term's different meanings. In particular, we show how to generalize Sandra Mitchell's notion of integrative pluralism to circumstances where multiple epistemic tools of the same type are jointly necessary to solve scientific problems. We argue that the multiple definitions of biological function operate jointly in this way based on how biologists explain the evolution of protein function. To clarify how our account relates to existing views, we introduce a general typology for monist and pluralist accounts along with standardized criteria for judging which is best supported by evidence.

An account of conserved functions and how biologists use them to integrate cell and evolutionary biology

“…Among these consequences, we argue that uses of the conserved function concept illustrate how fields such as cell biology and evolutionary biology can be epistemically integrated even as their research primarily investigates role functions or evolutionary functions, respectively. Put differently, the examples we present give new evidence for integrative pluralism about functions (Cusimano and Sterner (2019). Furthermore, we argue that understanding the epistemology of conserved functions helps address many longstanding challenges for concepts of evolutionary functions raised by Kitcher (1993) and Cummins (2002).…”

“…Most of the recent literature on function has focused on refining existing definitions and clarifying their relationships in order to illuminate and possibly avoid these problems, with some occasional novel views proposed (Saborido 2014;Garson 2016). Relatively less attention has been paid to developing a picture of how pluralism about function may contribute positively to biological research practices (Currie 2015;Cusimano and Sterner 2019).…”

Putting History Back into Mechanisms

“…Neander ([2017], Chapter 3) and Garson ([2018]) criticize this picture. Also see Cusimano and Sterner ([2019]), and Malaterre ([forthcoming]), for recent approaches to function pluralism.…”

Explaining ambiguity in scientific language

“…There is no restriction on the structure of networks partial synonyms may form, which for example could take the form of a strict semantic hierarchy or of a family resemblance, i.e where no single meaning is shared by all and only the partial synonyms in the network. See Cusimano and Sterner (2019) for more extensive discussion of the types of semantic relationships among partial synonyms that philosophers have formulated in the setting of conceptual analysis.…”