2017
DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2016.2521339
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Integrity Attacks on Real-Time Pricing in Smart Grids: Impact and Countermeasures

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Cited by 97 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…We solve the LMIs in [29] by letting c 3 = 0.500, M given as (18), H = I and minimizing µ to obtain observer with γ = 22.4. We let m ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5).…”
Section: Assumptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We solve the LMIs in [29] by letting c 3 = 0.500, M given as (18), H = I and minimizing µ to obtain observer with γ = 22.4. We let m ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5).…”
Section: Assumptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For given false alarm rate A and probability p ∈ (0, 1), the p-probable hidden reachable set of the attack sequence δ k in (14), R p α , is defined as the set of e k ∈ R n , k ∈ N that can be reached from the origin e 1 = 0 due to the the attacker's action δ k restricted to satisfyĀ = A and…”
Section: A Attack Model and Hidden Reachable Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The authors used Kalman filter based approach to resolve the synchronization problem in phase measurement units while using large scale deployment. The authors of [40] proposed a system that can generate any arbitrary pricing signal. The proposed system is able to detect the correct pricing signal and protect any attack against pricing.…”
Section: Recent Advances Of the Signal Processing Techniques In Smartmentioning
confidence: 99%