The current thesis investigates how the Institutional Environment influences the mode of governance of property rights and the strategy of firms. The study is divided into two parts. The first part undertakes a theoretical investigation consisting of three steps. In the first step, the author examines the model of property rights developed by Barzel (1994, 1997, 2003). In the second step, an approach to competitive strategy based on property rights (Property Rights Perspective, Foss and Foss, 2001) is analyzed. Specifically, the author states that this approach represents an extension of Barzel's model and demonstrates that the concepts introduced in the previous step allow a more general formulation of the Property Rights Perspective, leading to a definition of competitive strategy that reconciles the notions of strategizing and economizing (Williamson, 1991). The last step examines particularly the establishment of strategies for protection of property rights. A heuristic model based on Williamson (1996) is proposed and three strategies for protection of property rights are defined in terms of the quality of the Institutional Environment: strategy based on the legal system, on the establishment of private mechanisms, and on the abandon of valuable attributes. The second part of the research seeks empirical evidence to support the theoretical model. The study examines three cases of protection of property rights on genetically modified (GM) technology in soybean seeds: the US, Brazil, and Argentina. Each case represents, respectively, a strategy as defined by the heuristic model. The research also examines econometric evidence that consolidate the empirical analysis. Overall, the current study develops an approach for examining the appropriation of value, placing itself in the interface between the Property Rights Economics, the study of Strategy, and the assessment of the Institutional Environment.