Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries

Chen, Yongmin; Puttitanun, Thitima

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.005

Cited by 465 publications

(297 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The empirical evidence in this regard has not been very helpful either. While Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), and Lerner (2002) find that stronger protection does not stimulate innovation, Kanwar and Evenson (2003), and Chen and Puttitanum (2005) find that it does. Even if the latter verdict is accepted, there is still not much clarity about which sectors of the economy would benefit the most from stronger protection.…”

Section: The Larger Picturementioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The Case of Developing Countries

Kanwar

2012

The Journal of Law and Economics

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Section: The Larger Picturementioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The Case of Developing Countries

Kanwar

2012

The Journal of Law and Economics

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“…Our paper extends these in ‡uential studies by endogenizing an important economic institution that is the IPR system and analyzing how it evolves as an economy develops towards the world technology frontier. 12 Furthermore, we consider innovation and multiple channels of foreign technology transfer through imitation and FDI that are key features of the Chinese economy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

Chu

Cozzi

Galli

2014

Journal of Development Economics

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Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Therefore, the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of patent strength increase as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in China. We are very grateful to the anonymous Referees and Patrick Francois (the Editor) for their insightful comments that have improved the manuscript signi…cantly. We also would like to thank Elias Dinopoulos, Rachel Gri¢ th, Oleksandr Talavera, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and seminar participants at

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“…The role of IPRs in innovation, economic growth and resource conservation has been debated for some time. The general notion has been that developing countries tend to lose by strong IPR protection and that this is the reason why many developing countries have refused to introduce increased IPR protection unless forced to do so by international agreements [31].…”

Section: Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights (Iprs)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nagoya Protocol: Fragmentation or Consolidation?

Richerzhagen

2014

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Abstract:In October, 2010, a protocol on access and benefit-sharing (ABS) of genetic resources was adopted, the so-called Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Before the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, the governance architecture of ABS was already characterized by a multifaceted institutional environment. The use of genetic resources is confronted with many issues (conservation, research and development, intellectual property rights, food security, health issues, climate change) that are governed by different institutions and agreements. The Nagoya Protocol contributes to increased fragmentation. However, the question arises whether this new regulatory framework can help to advance the implementation of the ABS provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This paper attempts to find an answer to that question by following three analytical steps. First, it analyzes the causes of change against the background of theories of institutional change. Second, it aims to assess the typology of the architecture in order to find out if this new set of rules will contribute to a more synergistic, cooperative or conflictive architecture of ABS governance. Third, the paper looks at the problem of "fit" and identifies criteria that can be used to assess the new ABS governance architecture with regard to its effectiveness.

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Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries

Cited by 465 publications

References 31 publications

Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The Case of Developing Countries

Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Licensing: The Case of Developing Countries

Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

The Nagoya Protocol: Fragmentation or Consolidation?

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