Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise∗

Handel, Michael I.

doi:10.1080/01402398408437190

Cited by 62 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Presenting answers derived from the computations does not support the critical analytic function of corroboration [20,21]. Corroboration is the search for other data that would confirm or reject the current answer.…”

Section: Corroborationmentioning

confidence: 78%

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Morison

Woods

2016

Informatics

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Vehicles and platforms with multiple sensors connect people in multiple roles with different responsibilities to scenes of interest. For many of these human-sensor systems there are a variety of algorithms that transform, select, and filter the sensor data prior to human intervention. Emergency response, precision agriculture, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are examples of these human-computation-sensor systems. The authors examined a case of the latter to understand how people in various roles utilize the algorithms output to identify meaningful properties in data streams given uncertainty. The investigations revealed: (a) that increasingly complex interactions occur across agents in the human-computation-sensor system; and (b) analysts struggling to interpret the output of "black box" algorithms given uncertainty and change in the scenes of interest. The paper presents a new interactive visualization concept designed to "open up the black box" of sensor processing algorithms to support human analysts as they look for meaning in feeds from sensors.

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Section: Corroborationmentioning

confidence: 78%

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Morison

Woods

2016

Informatics

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“…40 Handel 2003, p. 42. 41 Authors who have discussed the compromise and domination dynamics include Bar-Joseph 1995, Handel 2003, pp. 28, 44, and Lowenthal 2000.…”

Section: Organizationalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs^†

Montgomery¹,

Mount

2014

Intelligence and National Security

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Various policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons, yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States's record of estimating foreign weapons programs has been uneven, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding sixteen of the twenty-five states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons, and to provide a framework for evaluating the causes of distorted intelligence estimates of nuclear proliferation. In particular, we identify twelve specific hypotheses related to politics, culture, bureaucracy, and organizational culture, then explore how they play out in practice through two case studies (North Korea and Israel). We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them.

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“…Such resources can be either material or non-material in nature (Handel, 1984), for example expert knowledge of the production of specific types of contaminants is non-material in nature but of importance in measuring the capability of an organisation's ability to implement a food defence incident. Jackson and Frelinger (2009, pp.8-11) provides a useful breakdown of separate, measurable components of capability such as: tools, situational awareness, number and quality of people available, technical skills, operational security skills, planning skills, command and control or leadership skills.…”

Section: Capabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the terrorist threat to the food supply: food defence, threat assessments, and the problem of vulnerability

Dalziel

2011

IJFSNPH

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Within a historically-informed framework utilising the related concepts of capability and intentions we identify and critically assess three core assumptions underlying the concept of food defence:1 that there is a 'real and current' threat to the food supply chain by terrorist organisations 2 such an attack is easy to do 3 the effects of such an attack can be extrapolated from food safety incidents.In doing so, we find that food defence is largely driven by perceptions of vulnerability, the effect of which is a misperception in threat.

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Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise∗

Cited by 62 publications

References 24 publications

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs^†

Assessing the terrorist threat to the food supply: food defence, threat assessments, and the problem of vulnerability

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About

Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise∗

Cited by 62 publications

References 24 publications

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Opening up the Black Box of Sensor Processing Algorithms through New Visualizations

Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs†

Assessing the terrorist threat to the food supply: food defence, threat assessments, and the problem of vulnerability

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs^†