Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion

Sims, Jennifer E.

doi:10.1080/02684520701200772

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…14 Yet, reflecting a wider set of cultural dispositions, it has been noted in the literature how open source intelligence is often regarded as 'less equal' than other, covert sources of intelligence; when, it is argued, it should be considered complimentary to such clandestine sources (Gibson, 2014b: 11-12). Irrespective of disparate occupational tendencies to favour one particular intelligence stream over another, in the organisational context of a move towards a pluralistic and synergetic 'all-source fusion' approach to intelligence work (see Russell, 2007;Sims, 2007;Day, Gibson and Ramwell, 2017) the ethical, proportionate, efficient, and effective use of informants will still remain important in tackling increasingly complex crimes (see Gioe, 2017). In other words, within a system that seeks to develop and exploit a plurality of sources, intelligence from informants will remain of considerable value.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mind the grass! Exploring the assessment of informant coverage in policing and law enforcement

Atkinson

2019

Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism

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The use of informants, or Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), has become a mainstay of contemporary policing and law enforcement in the United Kingdom as police, security and enforcement agencies seek to tackle a range of crimes. Recognising the relative paucity of enquiry on this subject, and addressing the associated requirement for further empirical research, this paper explores how 'informant coverage' -the extent to which informants can provide information on targets, suspects, crimes, and criminal conspiracies -is assessed in policing and law enforcement in Scotland. It is principally informed by qualitative research conducted in 2017 and 2018, comprised of semi-structured interviews with 19 participants. Drawing upon a thematic analysis of the resultant data, and enriched by the author's prior experience as a practitioner in this field, this paper identifies the strengths and limitations of established practices. Additionally, this paper highlights the emerging role of analysis, and the contribution of the intelligence analyst, in this specialist area of intelligence work. It concludes that if analysis is to make a valuable and continuing contribution to the effective use of informants in future practice then sustained proactive leadership will be required to support such innovative approaches.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mind the grass! Exploring the assessment of informant coverage in policing and law enforcement

Atkinson

2019

Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism

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“…The intelligence state combines the essential features of the security state and the surveillance state, protecting the homeland from internal and external threats through pervasive data collection and proactive policies aimed at counterterrorism and countering violent extremism [77]. It extends the reach of the security apparatus further by incorporating a broad range of analytical tools which enable analytical modelling and predictive analytics which stretch existing boundaries of surveillance [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of the Modern Intelligence State

Hardy¹

2021

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

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The rise of the formal surveillance state in the early twenty-first century was precipitated by political impetus to empower security and intelligence organisations to perform a broad range of counterterrorism functions. Ethical debates about the implications of the security intelligence reach of modern states have focused on balancing individual rights, liberties, and privacy against the security of the state. Meanwhile, the surveillance state has rapidly evolved into an intelligence state, capable not only of pervasive data collection, but also of analytical modelling which expands existing boundaries of surveillance. Existing concerns about the ethical collection and use of surveillance data are compounded by three emergent capabilities of the modern intelligence state: persistent data surveillance, pattern-of-life analysis, and activity-based intelligence. These intelligence methods provide descriptive and/or predictive models of human behaviour that empower governments to generate intelligence about the actual and the potential subjects of counterterrorism investigations. The ethical implications of counterterrorism intelligence extend beyond the collection and use of data to the application of predictive modelling to dehumanised patterns of behaviour. This process has the potential to redefine the boundaries of the person, particularly by blurring the distinction between thoughts and actions which threaten the state.

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“…mental illness, criminal history, substance misuse, extremes of personality, and personality disorder) are not so clear in the case histories of persons identified as terrorists (Monahan, 2012;Silke, 1998). Given these technical and epistemological concerns, critics claim the development of screening instruments for risk of violent extremism (and the technology and systems of governance and control they require or may set in motion) is unethical, potentially leading to illegal activity and human rights abuse by the State (Monahan, 2011;Sims 2007).…”

Section: Can Risk Assessment Paradigms Be Applied To Risk Of Violent mentioning

confidence: 99%

Can you identify violent extremists using a screening checklist and open-source intelligence alone?

Egan

Cole

et al. 2016

Journal of Threat Assessment and Management

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Checklist-based screening instruments have a role in the assessment of mentally disordered and criminal offenders, but their value for screening for vulnerability to violent extremism remains moot. This study examined the effectiveness of using the Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance to identify serious violence in persons convicted or killed in the process of committing a violent-extremist offense using open-source intelligence (i.e., publicly available archival material). Of 182 specific participants identified, specific offense data was available for 157 individuals. Blind kappas for individual items of the 16-item IVP guidance ranged from 0.67 to 1.00. IVP guidance was more reliable when applied to conventional terrorist groups, but missing information significantly reduced reliability. Weighting items thought more central to violent extremism (death rhetoric, extremist group membership, contact with recruiters, advanced paramilitary training, overseas combat) did not improve reliability or prediction. Although the total unweighted IVP score predicted some acts of violence, test effectiveness statistics suggested IVP guidance was most effective as a negative predictor of grave outcomes, and best applicable to conventional ideological violent extremists who came to this position through typical “terrorist” trajectories. Results suggest the IVP guidance has potential value as an initial screening tool, but must be applied appropriately to persons of interest, is strongly dependent on the integrity and completeness of information, and does not supercede human-led risk assessment of the case and acute risk states.

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Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Mind the grass! Exploring the assessment of informant coverage in policing and law enforcement

Mind the grass! Exploring the assessment of informant coverage in policing and law enforcement

The Rise of the Modern Intelligence State

Can you identify violent extremists using a screening checklist and open-source intelligence alone?

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