2013
DOI: 10.1037/npe0000010
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Intelligent people defect more in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.

Abstract: Why so many people make the theoretically irrational decision to cooperate in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game remains a puzzle in game theory. Recent developments in evolutionary psychology suggest that the anomaly may be attributable to evolutionary constraints on the human brain and their interaction with general intelligence. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses: (a) projection of a video image of another experimental subject increases cooperation because the human brain implicitly… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1

Citation Types

0
14
0
1

Year Published

2015
2015
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
3

Relationship

2
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 29 publications
(15 citation statements)
references
References 60 publications
0
14
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…There is, however, also evidence that goes into the opposite direction. Kanazawa and Fontaine (2013) report higher defection rates among more intelligent participants in a one-shot PD. Furthermore, using the strategy method to uncover different cooperative types in a public good game (PGG), Nielsen et al (2014) find that strict free-riders have higher scores in the cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) than conditional or unconditional cooperators.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…There is, however, also evidence that goes into the opposite direction. Kanazawa and Fontaine (2013) report higher defection rates among more intelligent participants in a one-shot PD. Furthermore, using the strategy method to uncover different cooperative types in a public good game (PGG), Nielsen et al (2014) find that strict free-riders have higher scores in the cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) than conditional or unconditional cooperators.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…Consistent with this reasoning, more intelligent individuals are more likely to make the theoretically rational choice to defect in one‐shot Prisoner's Dilemma games (Kanazawa & Fontaine, ). This may be because more intelligent individuals are better able to comprehend the evolutionarily novel situations of complete anonymity and absolutely no possibility of knowing future interactions and make the rational decision to defect.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…For example, more intelligent individuals are more likely to make the theoretically rational choice to defect in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games (Kanazawa & Fontaine, 2013). This may be because more intelligent individuals are better able to comprehend the evolutionarily novel entities of complete anonymity and absolutely no possibility of knowing future interactions and make the rational decision to defect.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%