Intended outcome expands in time

Makwana, Mukesh; Srinivasan, Narayanan

doi:10.1038/s41598-017-05803-1

Cited by 21 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…A simple test of this hypothesis would be to measure the subjective duration of the outcome; more attention would result in a longer perceived outcome durations in causal, compared to non-causal trials. Related to this idea Makwana and Srinivasan (2017) reported that outcomes that were intended by the participants appeared to last subjectively longer than unintended outcomes. Empirically, a systematic drift in attention could also explain the results of Experiments 3 and 4, because fewer clock pulses, overall, would accumulate during causal, than non-causal intervals.…”

Section: Where Is Attention Allocated In Temporal Binding?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

2019

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Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as temporal binding. One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an "internal clock" that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants' perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time). This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to noncausal sequences. These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of temporal binding. Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are discussed.

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Section: Where Is Attention Allocated In Temporal Binding?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

2019

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“…This suggests a possibility that onset timing, but not offset timing, shifts perception toward the action, and as a result, the event duration is expanded. A recent study (Makwana & Srinivasan, 2017) If this model is true, where the perceptual duration of the event dilates, we can further speculate that the perception of onset should be difficult or imprecise, since the actual timing to be judged presents itself without a clear perceptual edge (i.e., for a subjectively expanded event). Indeed, the data from Experiment 3 supports this, the variance of reported timing of the tone was significantly larger than baseline, regardless of agency conditions ( Figure S5), suggesting that the time perception was less precise in action-outcome situations, especially for tone.…”

Section: Only "Onset" Shifts (Model 2)mentioning

confidence: 74%

“…The key purpose of the current study was to temporally examine onset and offset agency. The former can be defined as the subjective feeling of generating an action itself, as well as through a difference in time perception (delay detection, duration estimation, or timing report) (Engbert et al, 2007;Haggard et al, 2002;Makwana & Srinivasan, 2017) c.f. (Farrer et al, 2013) in the sensory event generated by the action.…”

Section: Onset/offset Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action.Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation.Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency. Extended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating one's own actions (Gallagher, 2000).Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, "free will," "self-consciousness," and/or "volition" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018).Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during "agentive action." However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as "ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)," "cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am)," "I move, therefore I am," or "I predict, therefore I am." (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian "inverse" probability or inference (e.g., "thought as action"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as ...

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“…However, it is still unclear whether an action irrelevant to the stimulus-motion speed changes the apparent-motion speed; if it does, there would be two possible explanations: either an action affects the apparent-motion speed directly or it affects the apparent-motion speed indirectly via the change in the apparent duration of the motion stimulus because the duration of stimuli following an action (e.g. saccade) was known to appear to be longer in consequent stimuli (chronostasis) [13, 14], resulting in that the estimation of speed will decrease if the motion system calculates the speed as spatial displacement per an unit time. Because speed changes proportionally with duration when the movement distance is physically fixed, the change in apparent speed of a moving stimulus should covary with the apparent duration of that stimulus.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Apparent speed of motion concomitant with action alters with delay

Monno

Hisakata

2019

PLoS ONE

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Multiple studies have shown action to affect perception of motion. The speed intended in the generation of a motion by action affects the apparent speed of the motion. However, it was unclear whether action with no intention of speed affects the apparent speed of a motion. In Experiment 1, we investigated the apparent speed of a motion following a key press action. We manipulated the delay from the action to the consequent motion for shifting the timing of efference copy and found the apparent speed decreasing with increases in the delay. This could be because it is known that speed irrelevant action caused expansion of perceived duration of the consequent stimulus and it might have influenced the result in Experiment 1, we investigated the apparent duration of the action consequent static (Ex. 2-1) and motion (Ex. 2-2) stimulus. We found that the apparent duration was not changed with delay. Moreover, the apparent speed and duration had different characteristics on delay. These results were discussed in terms of the sense of agency.

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Intended outcome expands in time

Cited by 21 publications

References 78 publications

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Apparent speed of motion concomitant with action alters with delay

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