2018
DOI: 10.1111/rati.12198
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will

Abstract: In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.

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Cited by 3 publications
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