Intensity valence

Abstract

We study a continuous one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition with two office-motivated candidates differentiated by their "intensity valence", the degree to which they will implement their announced policy. The model generates results that differ significantly from those obtained in models with additive valence. First, the low intensity valence candidate is supported by voters with ideal points on both extremes of the policy space. Second, there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in which the high intensity valence candidate wins if the distribution of voters in the policy space is sufficiently homogeneous. If, instead, this distribution is sufficiently heterogeneous, there are PSNE in which the low intensity valence candidate wins. For moderate heterogeneity, only mixed strategy equilibria exist.

Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling

“…Too much heterogeneity may be problematic to implement intensively a policy. Above a threshold of heterogeneity, it is even known that it is the candidate with low intensity who has such dominant strategies, and he is less and less constrained by the median voter (Gouret and Rossignol, 2019, Proposition 3). It would be interesting to see if in more recent elections the distribution of voter preferences was too heterogenous for the candidate with high intensity valence to have dominant strategies.…”

“…Various authors have tried to understand the consequences of this simple extension of the Downsian utility function (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000, Groseclose, 2001, Dix and Santore, 2002, Aragones and Palfrey, 2002, Evrenk, 2009, Hummel, 2010, Xefteris, 2012, Aragonès and Xefteris, 2012, Xefteris, 2014; see Evrenk (2019) for a review of the literature. 6 The intensity valence utility function has been analyzed formally by Gouret and Rossignol (2019) and proposed initially by Gouret et al (2011) based on a French pre-election survey. The intensity valence supposes that the valence represents the ability of a candidate for implementing a policy.…”

“…We test three theoretical utility functions: (1) the basic Downsian utility function; (2) the additive valence utility function which has been widely studied in the literature; (3) lastly, the intensity valence utility function studied formally by Gouret and Rossignol (2019) and proposed initially by Gouret et al (2011); see also Kartik and McAfee (2007, Section IV.C. ) for a close idea.…”

“…Indeed, Gouret and Rossignol (2019) have shown that a low intensity valence candidate may have dominant strategies which insure him to obtain the majority if the distribution of voters in the policy space is too heterogenous. Nevertheless, the distribution of voters in 2004 is sufficiently homogenous for Bush to have dominant strategies which are statistically significant, at least under the assumption that all the voters who would have preferred Nader vote strategically.…”