Intention as Belief

Abstract

What's the relationship between (1) intending to do something, (2) believing that you are going to do this, and (3) its being the case that you are going to do the thing in question? I propose a position on which all three categories, correctly understood, amount in the fundamental case to the very same thing. The belief that constitutes future-directed intention, when strong, likewise constitutes one as having a real tendency to act in the intended way.

Hope: a solution to the puzzle of difficult action

“…My aim is to take issue with the lines of argument just sketched and establish the superiority of the Hope View as an alternative way to understand the mental aspect of difficult action. Those who argue that we should solve the puzzle of difficult action by rejecting the Evidence Claim hold that you can reach the belief that you will φ directly via practical reasoning, and that such a belief should therefore not be appraised in light of the evidentialist standards of 'theoretical reasoning' (see Marušić 2012Marušić , 2015Marušić and Schwenkler 2018;Schwenkler 2022;Marušić and Schwenkler 2022). Because it is not subject to the canons of theoretical rationality, but instead to those of practical rationality, the belief that you will φ should be seen as rational when held directly in response to the practical considerations supporting your decision, as opposed to held in 6 See in particular Marušić (2012Marušić ( , 2015; Marušić and Schwenkler (2018); Schwenkler (2022); Marušić and Schwenkler (2022) for a defense of the Seriousness Claim along the lines to be developed in the rest of this paragraph.…”

“…Sartrean Pragmatists insist that belief's characteristic effects include 'planning for p, asserting p, and acting as if p' (Marušić 2012, 6;2015, 33-35;Marušić and Schwenkler 2018, 316-321;Schwenkler 2022, Section 2). They then note that those who have decided to φ in cases of difficult action typically manifest the behavioural dispositions associated with the belief that they will φ (Marušić 2012, 6):…”

“…In particular, I argue that hope can play a distinctive role in motivating and rationalizing 2 See especially Marušić (2012Marušić ( , 2015; Marušić and Schwenkler (2018); Schwenkler (2022); Marušić and Schwenkler (2022). Philosophers who accept the Seriousness Claim also plausibly include Harman (1976), Velleman (1989), and Setiya (2008).…”