Intention-Based Sharing

Abstract

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other's intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.

Gender Differences in Yielding to Social Influence: An Impunity Experiment

“…After reading the instructions, before starting the experimental task, you will have to answer to few control questions; these questions are going to help you to understand the experimental task, and they have no effect on your final earnings. 9 Our companion study (Di Cagno et al [18]) does not focus on gender effects but on how weakest social influence is moderated by sanctioning in sharing games with and without monitoring proposer generosity as well as by experience with such games. Both studies together confirm Results 1 and 2.…”

“…After reading the instructions aloud participants could privately ask questions. They then were privately Data come from a more comprehensive experiment (reported in Di Cagno et al [18]) without the present focus on gender differences, but varying strategic aspects via distinguishing three types of sharing games each played across three rounds, in the order impunity, yes-no and ultimatum game, or vice versa. To avoid any diversification effects, only one (out of nine) randomly selected round has been actually paid.…”