Intentional binding of visual effects

Rueß, Miriam; Thomaschke, Roland; Kiesel, Andrea

doi:10.3758/s13414-017-1479-2

Cited by 36 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The ANOVA indicated a significant effect of outcome delay on estimated-delay ratio (F(1.44, 47.61) = 5.69, p = 0.012, η 2 p = 0.147), although post-hoc tests showed no differences between all adjacent delay conditions (ps > 0.149). These results suggest that visual intentional binding can occur only when the action-outcome temporal discrepancy is smaller than 500 ms. Interestingly, this temporal limit of visual intentional binding was consistent with previous findings (Ebert & Wegner, 2010;Engbert et al, 2008;Ruess et al, 2018). Error bars denote standard error of the mean.…”

Section: Sense Of Agency In the Visual Domainsupporting

confidence: 91%

“…It has been shown that visual feedback on action is able to induce sense of agency which can be modulated by temporal congruence between action and the feedback based on the comparator mechanism (Farrer, Bouchereau, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2008;Farrer et al, 2013;Franck et al, 2001;Imaizumi & Asai, 2017). Moreover, intentional binding has also been observed in the visual domain (Ebert & Wegner, 2010;Engbert et al, 2008), but can be weaker than in the auditory domain (Ruess et al, 2018). We expected that in this experiment, subjective ratings of agency over visual outcomes, similar to auditory outcomes, would be modulated by action-outcome temporal congruence (i.e., outcome delays).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Intentional binding can be measured mainly in two ways: a clock reading paradigm (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), where participants report the clock-hand position at the time when they pressed the key or heard a tone following the keypress (Haggard et al, 2002); or an interval estimation paradigm where participants verbally estimate the temporal interval between an action and its outcome (Engbert, Wohlschlager, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007). Intentional binding, as well as explicit judgment of agency, can be reduced by temporal discrepancy between an action and its outcome in healthy individuals (Haggard et al, 2002;Ruess, Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 2018). From a psychiatric perspective, both implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency can also reflect the abnormal sense of agency in schizophrenia.…”

Section: Explicit and Implicit Measures Of Sense Of Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Imaizumi

Tanno

2019

Consciousness and Cognition

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Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action-outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress-outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.

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Section: Sense Of Agency In the Visual Domainsupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explicit and Implicit Measures Of Sense Of Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Imaizumi

Tanno

2019

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…This visual inferiority is consistent with previous findings on the other perceptual phenomena related to agency. For instance, the intentional binding effect, whereby subjective timings of voluntary action and its sensory outcome attract each other ((Haggard et al, 2002), also see Experiment 3), is weakened for a visual outcome relative to an auditory outcome (Ruess et al, 2018). Sensory attenuation, another agency-related perceptual modulation, whereby individuals are likely to perceive decreased intensity of sensory events caused by themselves, than by others or the environment, is robust in tactile (Blakemore et al, 1999) and auditory (Weiss, Herwig, & Schutz-Bosbach, 2011) domains, while "visual" attenuation is unlikely to occur (Schwarz, Pfister, Kluge, Weller, & Kunde, 2018).…”

Section: The Outcome In Modalitiesmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Previous studies have included many actions, such as single key-pressing (e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005), continuous motor control (e.g., Knoblich & Kircher, 2004), or even gesturing (e.g., Daprati et al, 1997). Therefore, the sensory outcomes (e.g., sensory modalities, including vision or audition) depend on the action as the generator (Mifsud & Whitford, 2017;Ruess, Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 2018). Though previous studies have suggested that unnatural (Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015;Ebert & Wegner, 2010) c.f.…”

Section: Onset (Generation) Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action.Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation.Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency. Extended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating one's own actions (Gallagher, 2000).Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, "free will," "self-consciousness," and/or "volition" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018).Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during "agentive action." However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as "ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)," "cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am)," "I move, therefore I am," or "I predict, therefore I am." (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian "inverse" probability or inference (e.g., "thought as action"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as ...

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