Intentionalism Defended

Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?

“…However, Byrne (2001) claims that there is no good reason to accept the claim that representation requires the possibility of misrepresentation. Beliefs in necessary truths (such as two plus two equals four) and the Cogito (I think therefore I am) provide counterexamples.…”

“…For example, Byrne (2001) claims that we should understand perceptual representation as occurring whenever things seem a certain way to a subject. According to this understanding, Byrne claims, because sense-data will always seem a certain way to a subject they will be represented to the subject.…”

The Representational Character of Experience

“…It is not easy to see how this could happen. Byrne (2001) has argued that this could not happen, on the grounds that any phenomenal difference between visual experiences is a difference in how things seem, and any difference between how things seem is a difference in representational content. Even if one resists this argument (on the grounds, perhaps, that it involves an equivocation on "how things seem"), it is not easy to come up with specific cases of phenomenally distinct visual experiences with the same content.…”

Against intentionalism

“…Peacocke himself dismisses the example on these grounds (see Peacocke, 1983, p.17). 5 Many theorists who otherwise disagree share the assumption that experiences have representational content, such as Heck (2000), McDowell (1994), Peacocke (1992), Evans (1982), Searle (1983), Stalnaker (1998), Thau (2002, Tye (1995Tye ( , 2000, Byrne (2001). Some theorists who deny that experiences have content are sense-datum theorists who believe that the sense-data are not themselves contents, such as Russell (1912/77).…”

“…In fact, a theorist who accepts INTENTIONALISM can appeal to functional differences between the deliverances of vision and audition to explain the difference in the 6 See for example Byrne (2001), Dretske (1995), Harman (1999), Lycan (1996), Thau (2002), Tye (1995), and(2000). Rather, a non-reductive intentionalist holds that we cannot understand the content properties of an experience independently of its phenomenal properties on the following grounds.…”