Intentionality and Phenomenology

Wilson, Robert A.

doi:10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00183.x

Cited by 27 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…While there is a growing body of evidence for saturation and a quadratic frequency dependence in cuprates, particularly along the nodal direction, there is mounting evidence too for some form of strong bosonic feature in the antinodal regions near the Brillouin zone boundaries, [49][50][51] the origin of which remains controversial. [52][53][54] This contribution to ⌫͑ , T , ͒ should also be explored within the present phenomenology for completeness. What we would argue however, is that since scattering is already so intense at ͑ ,0͒, the true, ideal form of ⌫͑͒ ͓and Im ⌺͔͑͒ in this region of the Brillouin zone inevitably will be significantly renormalized due to the overarching presence of ⌫ MIR , masking the inherent nature of ⌫͑͒ in many of the physical properties that are measured.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Optical response of high-Tccuprates: Possible role of scattering rate saturation and in-plane anisotropy

2006

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We present a generalized Drude analysis of the in-plane optical conductivity ab ͑T , ͒ in cuprates taking into account the effects of in-plane anisotropy. A simple ansatz for the scattering rate ⌫͑T , ͒, that includes anisotropy, a quadratic frequency dependence, and saturation at the Mott-Ioffe-Regel limit, is able to reproduce recent normal state data on an optimally doped cuprate over a wide frequency range. We highlight the potential importance of including anisotropy in the full expression for ab ͑T , ͒ and challenge previous determinations of ⌫͑͒ in which anisotropy was neglected and ⌫͑͒ was indicated to be strictly linear in frequency over a wide frequency range. Possible implications of our findings for understanding thermodynamic properties and self-energy effects in high-T c cuprates will also be discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Optical response of high-Tccuprates: Possible role of scattering rate saturation and in-plane anisotropy

2006

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“…6 Accounts of the general determinacy claim have been defended by Loar (1995), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Graham et al (2007), Horgan and Graham (2012), Kriegel (2014) and Farkas (2008), among others (see Kriegel, 2014, for an overview). There has also been resistance to the claim that thought content is phenomenally individuated (see, e.g., Wilson, 2003;Pautz, 2013). 7 The account that we find more plausible is that phenomenal characters supervene on contents.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Vicente

Jorba

2017

Nous

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In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought‐content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought‐content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.

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“…They exploit the same basic intuition, which, however, I shall try to develop in a new direction in Phenomenal judgements and Phenomenological continuity sections. 3 See for example Wilson 2003, who in response to Horgan and Tienson remarks that "the notion of phenomenology itself is as contestable ... as is that of intentionality" (429). 4 One may argue -as Searle has done (Searle 1992, 151ff.)…”

Section: Attitudes Worth Fighting Formentioning

confidence: 99%

The phenomenology of propositional attitudes

Klausen

2007

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent.

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Intentionality and Phenomenology

Cited by 27 publications

References 23 publications

Optical response of high-Tccuprates: Possible role of scattering rate saturation and in-plane anisotropy

Optical response of high-Tccuprates: Possible role of scattering rate saturation and in-plane anisotropy

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

The phenomenology of propositional attitudes

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