Interacting with agents without a mind: the case for artificial agents

Geiselmann, Rebecca; Tsourgianni, Afroditi; Deroy, Ophelia; Harris, Lasana T

doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2023.101282

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 83 publications

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“… 42 or Wiese et al; 43 for review). Attributions in the absence of a human-like appearance known to activate social-cognitive brain processes leading to an attribution of mental states like intentionality 44 , 45 , 46 are less clearly documented: While the interaction with voice-based AI assistants can elicit a perceived social presence, 47 chatbots are perceived as not having intentions and hence are considered not responsible for their recommendations. 34 …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intelligence brings responsibility - Even smart AI assistants are held responsible

Longin¹,

Bahrami²,

Deroy³

2023

iScience

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intelligence brings responsibility - Even smart AI assistants are held responsible

Longin¹,

Bahrami²,

Deroy³

2023

iScience

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Co‐perceiving: Bringing the social into perception

Deroy,

Longin,

Bahrami

2024

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co‐perception. Co‐perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind‐reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re‐examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes.This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities

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The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?

Deroy¹

2023

Topoi

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Despite facing significant criticism for assigning human-like characteristics to artificial intelligence, phrases like “trustworthy AI” are still commonly used in official documents and ethical guidelines. It is essential to consider why institutions continue to use these phrases, even though they are controversial. This article critically evaluates various reasons for using these terms, including ontological, legal, communicative, and psychological arguments. All these justifications share the common feature of trying to justify the official use of terms like “trustworthy AI” by appealing to the need to reflect pre-existing facts, be it the ontological status, ways of representing AI or legal categories. The article challenges the justifications for these linguistic practices observed in the field of AI ethics and AI science communication. In particular, it takes aim at two main arguments. The first is the notion that ethical discourse can move forward without the need for philosophical clarification, bypassing existing debates. The second justification argues that it’s acceptable to use anthropomorphic terms because they are consistent with the common concepts of AI held by non-experts—exaggerating this time the existing evidence and ignoring the possibility that folk beliefs about AI are not consistent and come closer to semi-propositional beliefs. The article sounds a strong warning against the use of human-centric language when discussing AI, both in terms of principle and the potential consequences. It argues that the use of such terminology risks shaping public opinion in ways that could have negative outcomes.

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Interacting with agents without a mind: the case for artificial agents

Cited by 5 publications

References 83 publications

Intelligence brings responsibility - Even smart AI assistants are held responsible

Intelligence brings responsibility - Even smart AI assistants are held responsible

Co‐perceiving: Bringing the social into perception

The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?

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