Intercept Probability Analysis over the Cascaded Fisher-Snedecor ℱ Fading Wiretap Channels

Abstract

In this paper, we have investigated the physical layer security over cascaded Fisher-Snedecor F fading channels in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. To characterize the eavesdroppers' intercept capability, both the conceptual k-th nearest and best eavesdroppers are introduced. The probability density function (PDF) of the k-th nearest and best eavesdropper is characterized. The probability of interception, Pint, is correspondingly regarded as the secrecy metric, and is further derived with closed-form expressions in terms of Fox's H-function. For the purposes of providing more insights, the asymptotic behavior of the intercept probability is also provided. To explore the effects of the eavesdroppers' density and the channel fading conditions on the secrecy performance, we have performed the Monte-Carlo simulation and compared our analytical results with the simulated ones. One can find that our analytical results are successfully verified by the simulation results.

Physical Layer Intercept Probability in Wireless Sensor Networks over Fisher–Snedecor \({\mathcal{F}}\) Fading Channels

“…In the final step, the integral in ( 14) is solved by substituting (A6) and utilizing [29] (Equation (07.34.21.0009.01)), thus obtaining the form of (17).…”

“…Additionally, achievable PLS over mixed fading channels, including the F , such as Nakagami-m/F channels, was determined in [16]. In [17], the intercept probability of a randomly distributed eavesdroppers in the N cascaded F wiretap channels, was introduced. The asymptotic behavior of intercept probability in the case of the nearest and the best eavesdropper's overhearing was also investigated.…”

“…The scheduling framework requires knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of the main as well as the wiretap channels. This is a commonly exploited assumption in PLS analysis and frequently justified in numerous papers [13,[15][16][17]20,23].…”

“…with B denoting the transmission bandwidth. Following the physical layer security literature [16,17,20,23], the eavesdropper is assumed to have perfect knowledge of legitimate transmissions from and to the sink, including the coding and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm, and secret key, except that the source signal is confidential. This is a common assumption in numerous papers since the eavesdropper could be a legitimate WSN user with restricted access to secrecy data.…”

Comprehensive Physical Layer Security Analysis of FSO Communications Over Málaga Channels

“…where ln(1 + γ 1 ) and ln(1 + γ 2 ) are the instantaneous channel capacity of the main and wiretap channels, respectively. Under the active eavesdropping scenario, the node S has full CSI of both the main and wiretap channels, based on which S can adapt the achievable secrecy rate accordingly [28]. In this case, the ergodic or average secrecy capacity is a useful secrecy performance metric.…”