Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict

Abstract

Many researchers have reported empirical support for the liberal proposition that increased trade between states reduces their propensity to engage in militarized conflict. However, the literature has been less vocal on the effects of interdependence once actual conflict has started. The author, who builds on the opportunity-cost explanation for the commercial peace, first shows how that explanation can fit a bargaining framework of conflict. It is then argued that if trade reduces conflict by raising its opportunity costs prior to its onset, the prospective opportunity costs should remain high during conflict as well and decrease its observed duration, a prediction that can also be derived from a simple war-of-attrition game. The proposed inverse relationship between interdependence and conflict duration is evaluated empirically, using all militarized interstate disputes between 1950 and 1992. The author utilizes both continuous and discrete-time duration models and considers a number of alternative model specifications and concept measurements, and the results are generally supportive of the tested hypothesis. In addition, a two-stage model of dispute onset and duration is estimated, which reveals that more probable disputes are also longer, but the observed selection pattern does not seem to influence the positive effect of interdependence on the hazards of dispute termination.

The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration1

“…The lack of significance for Joint Democracy is surprising and stands in contrast to recent studies on MID duration that find democratic dyads experience shorter conflicts (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2004; Krustev 2006). Sample issues do play a small part in the difference in the results; we include all MID participants while Bueno De Mesquita et al.…”

“…However, the major explanation behind this finding is the updated temporal range of our data. Both Bueno De Mesquita et al (2004) and Krustev (2006) analyze MIDs between 1950 and 1992, while our sample includes updated MID data through 2000. This has important implications for the analysis.…”

“…We follow recent studies on conflict duration and explore a broad class of MIDs, rather than limiting our study to wars (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2004; Krustev 2006). If we simply investigate wars, we exclude the majority of international disputes, as only 21 wars have occurred since 1950.…”

Choosing Your Neighbors: Networks of Diffusion in International Relations1

“…In international security, proximity is often incorporated into opportunity ⁄ willingness models of conflict, where proximate states are expected to be more willing to go to war with each other, while opportunities to engage in conflict are expected to decline with distance (Siverson and Starr 1991;Starr and Thomas 2005). The most frequently used measure of proximity in this literature is border contiguity (Beck, King, and Zeng 2000;Lemke and Reed 2001;Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001;Leeds 2003;Reiter and Stam 2003;Rasler and Thompson 2006), while some studies also include ordinal contiguity ''scores'' (Slantchev 2004), centroid-to-centroid distances (Goldstein et al 2007), and capital-to-capital distances (Chiozza 2002;Clark and Regan 2003;Dorussen 2006;Krustev 2006). 5 While voluminous, most of this literature treats geography as a control variable of only secondary theoretical interest.…”

Every Story Has a Beginning, Middle, and an End (But Not Always in That Order): Predicting Duration Dynamics in a Unified Framework

“…In the sense that one can interpret any binary time-series cross-sectional models as an application of survival analysis [Beck et al, 1998, Carter andSignorino, 2010], survival analysis is arguably the single most predominant mode of analysis in conflict research. Scholars of international and civil conflict have utilized the technique of survival analysis to study the duration of conflict (i.e., conflict termination) [e.g., Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008, Bennett and Stam, 1998, 1996, Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2004, Cunningham et al, 2009, Fearon, 2004, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Goemans, 2000, Krustev, 2006, Langlois and Langlois, 2009, Ramsay, 2008, Regan and Stam, 2000, Shannon et al, 2010, Slantchev, 2004, Stanley and Sawyer, 2009] and the durability of peace after and/or before conflict (i.e., conflict onset and recurrence) [e.g., Fortna, 2003, Gibler and Tir, 2010, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Grieco, 2001, Lo et al, 2008, Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008, Senese and Quackenbush, 2003, Tir, 2003, Werner, 1999, Werner and Yuen, 2005.…”