1996
DOI: 10.1162/isec.20.4.42
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Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I

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Cited by 49 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…In another study, Jungblut, (2011) examines economic interdependence and inter-state conflicts. He based his analysis on versions of the liberal hypothesis, and functionalists' research such as that by Haas and Mitrany (1964), political and economic liberalism (Russett, O'neal, & Davis, 1998), and theories of international exchange (Polachec & McDonald, 1992 (Buzan, 1984;Papayoanou, 1996). A group of scholars, who maintains the Marxist's point of view, oppose the liberal, functionalist, and realist theories and argue that, interdependence and conflict are unrelated.…”
Section: Interdependence and Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In another study, Jungblut, (2011) examines economic interdependence and inter-state conflicts. He based his analysis on versions of the liberal hypothesis, and functionalists' research such as that by Haas and Mitrany (1964), political and economic liberalism (Russett, O'neal, & Davis, 1998), and theories of international exchange (Polachec & McDonald, 1992 (Buzan, 1984;Papayoanou, 1996). A group of scholars, who maintains the Marxist's point of view, oppose the liberal, functionalist, and realist theories and argue that, interdependence and conflict are unrelated.…”
Section: Interdependence and Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, the so-called structural theories of the democratic peace often contend that democratic states will be less likely to initiate military force because of the public's aversion to paying the costs of war (Doyle 1986, Maoz & Russett 1992. Other variants of this argument suggest that the public's desire to maintain economic growth leads democratic leaders to avoid military conflicts that will disrupt commerce (Domke 1988, Papayoanou 1996, Gelpi & Grieco 2006. The central mechanism of public casualty aversion and its influence on democratic foreign policies also underpin game theoretic models that seek to explain why democracies do not fight one another yet are willing to use force against nondemocracies (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, Fearon 1994.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Moravcsik (1997), when domestic and transnational economic actors who benefit from trade have more to gain from trade than from costly wars, those actors will try to wield influence over their government so it will not make any foreign policy decisions that could disrupt the economic ties with other countries that benefit them. Papayoanou (1996; see also Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999) also argues that we need to take into account the way domestic political institutions are designed and whether interest groups that support the government in power benefit from international trade or protectionism, when we determine whether a state having economic ties with other states would show cooperative or conflictual foreign policy toward them. In democracies, according to Papayoanou (1996), political leaders are sensitive to domestic opposition to war or costly adjustments that could cause damage to their economies, whereas autocratic leaders can seek aggressive foreign policy even though their economies depend heavily on international trade because there are no domestic constraints.…”
Section: China-south Korea Relations and The Liberal Peace Ideamentioning
confidence: 99%