Interdependence, Networks, and Public Policy Support

Chaudoin, Stephen; Wilf, Meredith

doi:10.1093/isafpa/ory006

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In this paper, we consider both domestic and systemic factors simultaneously and show that the pattern of FDI flows is accounted for by both domestic factors and system interdependence. Our paper joins scholars' recent efforts of bringing in systemic factors to the studies of economic globalization (see, e.g., Hafner-Burton et al, 2009;Ward et al, 2013;Cao and Ward, 2014;Chaudoin et al, 2014;Chaudoin and Wilf, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

Complex dependence in foreign direct investment: network theory and empirical analysis

Schoeneman

Zhu²,

Desmarais³

2020

PSRM

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We develop a theoretical framework that accounts for complex dependence in foreign direct investment (FDI) relationships. Conventional theories of FDI focus on firm-, industry-, country-, or dyad-level characteristics to account for cross-border capital movements. Yet, today's globalized economy is characterized by the increasing fragmentation and dispersion of production processes, which gives rise to complex dependence among production relationships. Consequently, FDI flows should be represented and theorized as a network. Specifically, we argue that FDI relationships are reciprocal and transitive. We test these hypotheses along with conventional covariate determinants of FDI using an exponential random graph model (ERGM) for weighted networks. We find that FDI networks exhibit strong reciprocity and transitivity. Our network approach to studying FDI provides new insights into cross-border investment flows and their political and economic consequences, and more generally the dynamics of globalization. In addition to our substantive findings, we offer a broad methodological contribution by introducing the ERGM for count-weighted networks in political science.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

Complex dependence in foreign direct investment: network theory and empirical analysis

Schoeneman

Zhu²,

Desmarais³

2020

PSRM

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“…In the economic domain, Barnes and Hicks use the British Election Study and a survey experiment to show that news influences attitudes toward fiscal policy. Chaudoin and Wilf (2019) also use survey experiments to show that Americans' support for financial regulation is responsive to media stories that emphasize the consequences of regulation for financial stability of the American economy or network stability of the global economy. Ferraz and Finan (2008) use corruption audits in Brazil, where municipalities were randomly selected for such audits, to demonstrate that media coverage acts as an accountability mechanism for incumbents.…”

Section: Understanding Of Issue Countmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the financial crisis of 2008, banks and bankers have faced popular backlash across the globe, sentiments that have further fueled populist anger against a perceived elite capture of democratic politics (Gava, Sabaté, and Morales 2022; Massoc 2020). This phenomenon, which we refer to as “banklash,” has spawned new interest by political scientists in the determinants of public opinion on financial regulation (Chaudoin and Wilf 2019; Culpepper and Lee 2022, 2021). Some scholars argue that the increased financialization of the economy leads voters to view their interests as aligned with banks, and therefore to support policies that favor finance (Chwieroth and Walter 2019; Pagliari, Phillips, and Young 2020; Young and Yagci 2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation

Culpepper

Jung

Lee

2023

American J Political Sci

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Financial regulation is often adopted in the wake of scandals and crises. Yet political science has little to say about the political effects of corporate scandals. We break that silence, asking whether exposure to news coverage of bank scandals changes the preferences of voters for financial regulation. Drawing from the literatures on media influence and public opinion, we argue that news coverage of bank scandals should increase voters' appetite for regulation. We test our hypothesis with data from six countries, using original nationally representative panel surveys with embedded experiments (total N = 27,673). Our pooled and country-specific analyses largely support our expectation that exposure to news coverage of scandals increases regulatory preferences. We reproduce this finding in a separate survey wave, using different scandals than in our original analysis. These results contribute to studies on media influence on public opinion, the political significance of scandals, and the political economy of regulation.Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GTSYTZ. I t is scandalous how little political science has to say about the political impact of corporate scandals. Scandals involving politicians can topple a government. They are thus fertile terrain for studying scandal effects on voting intentions (Arias et al. 2018;Dziuda and Howell 2021;Entman 2012;Nyhan 2014). However, this tight focus on what Hacker and Pierson (2010) call "politics as electoral spectacle" limits the purview of politics to office seeking, to the neglect of policy seeking. Corporate scandals can disrupt markets and inflict mayhem on the lives of ordinary people, making them consequential to the outcome of policy battles. Such scandals can upend the traditionally dominant position of business interests in securing their preferred outcomes on economic regulation (Culpepper 2011;Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019).Indeed, previous work characterizes it as an iron law that financial regulation in the United States is enacted quickly and with insufficient information in the wake of scandals and crises (Romano 2005; 2014, 56-57). Such scandals also manifest the power to overturn previously steadfast opposition to regulation. The

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“…Therefore, during normal times, policymakers seeking to strengthen regulations typically face opposition from powerful, vested interests that seek to limit the regulatory burden of new rules, and includes financial firms (Lall 2012;Young 2013) and other, non-financial groups (Pagliari & Young 2014). Although regulatory changes that correct market failures may be supported by the public at large (Chaudoin & Wilf 2019;Young & Yagci 2019), the technical complexity of the issue and the collective action problems associated with regulating finance means that the public rarely mobilizes to demand financial regulations. As a result, policymakers' efforts to challenge regulatory opposition are unlikely to be rewarded during normal times (Aizenman 2009).…”

Section: Financial Crises and International Regulatory Changementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016

Pagliari

Wilf

2020

Regulation & Governance

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Financial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises' impact on international financial regulatory change, this paper develops a novel text-as-data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full population of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expectations, our empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.

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Interdependence, Networks, and Public Policy Support

Cited by 3 publications

References 45 publications

Complex dependence in foreign direct investment: network theory and empirical analysis

Complex dependence in foreign direct investment: network theory and empirical analysis

Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation

Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016

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